The Political Economy of Environmental Federalism
RFF Internal Seminar
, Resources for the Future
Professor of Economics, University of Louisville Abstract
I will give an overview of two projects within the area of political economy of environmental federalism. A first project investigates how political institutions affect policy outcomes. In particular, do differences in the level of political centralization across countries affect the outcome of environmental decentralization? Political centralization, measured by the strength of national level political parties, appears to improve the result of decentralization of environmental policies addressing local environmental problems.
A second project evaluates competing political economy theories, which argue that politicians set converging middle-of-the road policies, or that they set policies that diverge across political parties. We evaluate these theories in the context of inter-jurisdictional strategic interaction in the enforcement of U.S. state environmental policies. Do Democratic governors respond differently to neighbors’ enforcement activities than do their Republican colleagues? That is, do governors respond strategically to neighboring states, while also positioning themselves based on in-state political considerations? We utilize data on state enforcement activities (inspections; punitive actions) under the Clean Air Act, the Clean Water Act, and the Resource and Conservation Recovery Act.
Tuesday, March 19, 2013
12:00 - 1:00 p.m.
Bring your own lunch.
7th Floor Conference Room
1616 P St. NW
Washington, DC 20036
All seminars will be in the 7th Floor Conference Room at RFF, 1616 P Street NW. Attendance is open, but involves pre-registration no later than two days prior to the event. For questions and to register to an event, please contact Khadija Hill at email@example.com (tel. 202-328-5174). Updates to our academic seminars schedule will be posted at www.rff.org/academicseminarseries.