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The Impact of Team Inspections on Enforcement and Deterrence
Lucija Anna Muehlenbachs, Stefan Staubli, Mark A Cohen
RFF Discussion Paper 13-36 | November 2013
RESEARCH TOPICS:
Abstract
This paper provides new insights into the productivity of teams. Government enforcement agencies often send teams of inspectors instead of a sole inspector to a regulated facility. Yet, determining the impact of teams is problematic due to endogeneity as the enforcement agency might naturally send larger teams when they expect a higher likelihood of violations. Exploiting exogenous variation in the number of inspectors that are sent to o shore oil and gas platforms in the Gulf of Mexico, we find that adding an inspector to a team does not simply result in more detected violations, it also increases the severity of sanctions imposed on those violations that are detected.
RELATED SUBTOPICS
Oil, Risk Regulation
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