Abstract: A carbon tax will interact with other policies that are intended to reduce carbon dioxide emissions and encourage clean sources of energy and energy efficiency. This paper examines these policy interactions. A well-designed carbon tax can be an efficient instrument for reducing emissions, yet whether it will be implemented in an efficient manner is uncertain. A legislatively determined tax may not fully reflect up-to-date scientific and economic information. Behavioral and institutional factors suggest that a tax may not have its fully intended effect. These considerations suggest that climate policy should and will continue to be a complex mix of regulaions at various levels of government, even with a carbon price. Nonetheless, the possibility of unintended interactions among policies remains. The role for policies to encourage renewables and energy efficiency depends on the stringency of the carbon tax and presence of externalities related to technological learning and the energy efficiency gap.

Abstract: Several recent studies have used simulation models to quantify the potential effects of recent environmental regulations on power plants, including the Mercury and Air Toxics Standards (MATS), one of the US Environmental Protection Agency’s most expensive regulations. These studies have produced inconsistent results about the effects on the industry, making general conclusions difficult. We attempt to reconcile these differences by representing the variety of assumptions in these studies within a common modeling platform. We find that the assumptions, and their differences from the way MATS will be implemented, make a substantial impact on projected retirement of coal-fired capacity and generation, investments that are required, and emissions reductions. Almost uniformly, the actual regulation, when examined in its final form and in isolation, provides more flexibility than is represented in most models. We find this leads to a smaller impact on the composition of the electricity generating fleet than most studies have predicted.

Abstract: National and subnational economies have started implementing carbon pricing systems unilaterally, from the bottom up. Therefore, the potential linking of individual cap-and-trade programs to capture efficiency gains and other benefits is of keen interest. This paper introduces a two-tiered framework to guide policymakers, with an interest in North American policy outcomes. One tier discusses program elements that need to be aligned before trading of allowances across programs can occur. The second identifies benefits of incremental alignment of program elements even prior to trading between programs—which we call “linking by degrees.” We apply this framework to California’s cap-and-trade program and the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative. These programs are already linking through cooperation and sharing of information. Many aspects of the program designs are ready for the exchange of allowances within a common market; however, the difference in allowance prices remains an issue to be considered before formal linking could occur.

Abstract: The failure of consumers to make seemingly cost-effective investments in energy efficiency is commonly referred to as the energy efficiency gap. We review the most recent literature relevant to the energy efficiency gap and in particular discuss what the latest insights from behavioral economics might mean for the gap. We find that engineering studies may overestimate the size of the gap by failing to account for all costs and neglecting particular types of economic behavior. Nonetheless, empirical evidence suggests that market failures such as asymmetric information and agency problems affect efficiency decisions and contribute to the gap. Behavioral anomalies have been shown to affect economic decisionmaking in a variety of other contexts and are being increasingly cited as an explanation for the gap. The relative contributions of the various explanations for the gap differ across energy users and energy uses. This heterogeneity poses challenges for policymakers, but also could help elucidate when different policy interventions will most likely be cost-effective. If behavioral anomalies can be more cleanly linked to energy efficiency investments, then policymakers will face new challenges in performing welfare analysis of energy efficiency policies.

Abstract: The U.S. Environmental Protection Agency’s (EPA) proposed greenhouse gas (GHG) performance standards for power plants are an important step forward in regulating GHGs in terms of both their substantive impact and legal precedent. Nevertheless, we have some concerns with the proposal, which we discuss in the following comments submitted to the agency. The majority of our comments are directed to ways that EPA can increase certainty for the industry—reducing costs and, possibly, improving environmental outcomes. We highlight two specific areas of concern. First, the current proposal contributes to the significant uncertainty facing existing sources. Second, EPA’s proposed averaging option for new facilities that will install carbon capture-and-storage (CCS) technology in the future, although intended to create a flexible pathway, unfortunately creates some new regulatory uncertainty. We also comment on EPA’s decision to combine most coal and gas generators into a single source category. We believe this decision is legally valid and practically important, and that EPA should resist pressure to reconsider.

Abstract: Implementation of new environmental regulations in the electricity industry has triggered concerns about system reliability. We find these regulations are unlikely to create the shock to the system as some worry. They lead to little change in generation capacity. The large costs associated with investments in pollution control technologies are partially offset by a decrease in the cost burden associated with tradable emissions allowances. The combined effects contribute to a 1 percent increase in retail electricity prices and a decrease in producer profits of about $3–$5 billion in 2020. Though it varies across scenarios and regions, over the simulation horizon, consumers pay approximately 70 percent of total costs. In 2020, for example, total annual costs are between $6.6 billion and $7.1 billion. The investment in pollution controls leads to substantial reductions in emissions of mercury and sulfur dioxide.

Abstract: A clean energy standard (CES) is a flexible approach to encouraging a cleaner technology mix for electricity production. The most recent federal CES proposal from Senator Bingaman would transform the way electricity is produced and result in substantial reductions in CO2 emissions with small national average electricity price effects through 2025. After 2025, electricity prices would increase substantially. The alternative compliance payment (ACP) for clean energy credit will be binding, and thus actual deployment of clean energy will fall short of the intended targets and cumulative emissions reductions by 2035 will be 12 percent smaller than they would be without an ACP. The small utility exemption from the CES requirements equates to roughly $29 billion in avoided electricity expenditures by the customers of exempted utilities in 2035 alone. Excluding power generated by existing nuclear and hydroelectric facilities from CES compliance responsibility raises electricity prices in competitive regions to the benefit of owners of existing nuclear and hydro capacity.