Abstract: Over the last half decade, a variety of federal legislative proposals for limiting greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions have been put forward, most of which would set a price on carbon. As of early 2013, the one politically plausible policy appears to be a carbon tax, passed as part of a larger fiscal reform package. Meanwhile, the US Environmental Protection Agency has begun regulating GHG emissions from a variety of sources using its authority under the Clean Air Act. It may be necessary to choose between these two policies, however. The Waxman–Markey cap-and-trade bill that failed in 2009 would have preempted much of this authority, and it appears likely that a carbon tax law would do the same. But how can one make this choice? What are the key questions and issues to consider? The purpose of this paper is to compare these policies. Our aim here is therefore not to determine whether an exchange is wise or unwise. Instead, our intention is to give policymakers and other interested readers an impartial assessment of both policies and, in particular, the features that are important to a comparative evaluation. We don’t give answers, but hope at least to give the right questions to ask.

Abstract: New Corporate Average Fuel Economy (CAFE) standards were recently passed in the United States with the twin goals of reducing greenhouse gas emissions and oil use. The new standards represent a dramatic change from recent policy. This paper examines the key features of the new rules, and compares them to previous CAFE standards in terms of flexibility and structure. The importance of consumer preferences and market forces on CAFE outcomes are identified. In the second part of the paper, the perspective of the consumer is explored. Consumer assessments of fuel economy savings with more fuel-efficient vehicles may be biased or incomplete, leading many to argue that there is an “energy efficiency gap” in consumer demand for vehicles. Reasons for such a gap, such as market failures, behavioral responses, and market barriers, are summarized. The implications for policy are discussed, including the role of combining CAFE with other policies.

Abstract: Carbon markets are substantial and they are expanding. There are many lessons from experiences over the past eight years: fewer free allowances, better management of market-sensitive information, and a recognition that trading systems require adjustments that have consequences for market participants and market confidence. Moreover, the emerging international architecture features separate emissions trading systems serving distinct jurisdictions. These programs are complemented by a variety of other types of policies alongside the carbon markets. This sits in sharp contrast to the integrated global trading architecture envisioned 15 years ago by the designers of the Kyoto Protocol and raises a suite of new questions. In this new architecture, jurisdictions with emissions trading have to decide how, whether, and when to link with one another, and policymakers overseeing carbon markets must confront how to measure the comparability of efforts among markets and relative to a variety of other policy approaches.

Abstract: Economic approaches are expected to achieve environmental goals at less cost than traditional regulations, but they have yet to find widespread application. One reason is the way these tools interact with existing institutions. The federalist nature of governmental authority assigns to subnational governments much of the implementation of environmental policy and primary authority for planning the infrastructure that affects environmental outcomes. The federalist structure also interacts with the choice of economic instruments; a national emissions cap erodes the additionality of actions by subnational governments. Even the flagship application of sulfur dioxide emissions trading has been outperformed by the venerable Clean Air Act, and greenhouse gas emissions in the United States are on course to be less than they would have been if Congress had frozen emissions with a cap in 2009. The widespread application of economic tools requires a stronger political theory of how they interact with governing institutions.

Abstract: Climate policymaking faces twin challenges of carbon leakage and public sector revenue requirements. A large literature advocates the use of carbon dioxide (CO2) pricing and recycling the revenues to lower distorting taxes as a way to minimize costs. In this paper, we explore the implications of labor tax interactions for the cost-effectiveness of border adjustments and other measures to cope with leakage. We find that, for plausible values of labor supply elasticities, the cost savings from revenue recycling are significant—from 15 to 25 percent. The cost savings from anti-leakage measures are generally smaller, but also significant, particularly for small coalitions or more binding reduction targets. Tax interactions further enhance the cost savings from border adjustments, but make other measures like rebates or exemptions less attractive.

Abstract: Price collars have frequently been advocated to restrict the price of emissions permits. Consequently, collars were incorporated in the three bills languishing in Congress as well as in California's AB-32; Europeans are now considering price collars for EU ETS. In advocating collars, most analysts have assumed (1) collars will be implemented by government purchases and sales from bufferstocks, just like bands on foreign exchange rates or commodity prices; and (2) firms must surrender permits whenever they pollute. In fact, however, no actual emissions trading scheme has conformed to these assumptions. In the current paper, we maintain the second assumption (continual compliance) and show that while a price collar supported by a suffciently large bufferstock can restrict permit prices, a price collar supported instead by auctions with reserve prices cannot. In a companion paper (Hasegawa and Salant, 2012), we show that neither method works once account is taken of delayed compliance.

Abstract: France, Germany, and Sweden link vehicle taxes to the carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions rates of passenger vehicles. Based on new vehicle registration data from 2005–2010, a vehicle’s tax is negatively correlated with its registrations. The effect is somewhat stronger in France than in Germany and Sweden. Taking advantage of the theoretical equivalence between an emissions rate standard and a CO2-based emissions rate tax, we estimate the effect on manufacturers’ profits of reducing emissions rates. For France, a decrease of 5 grams of CO2 per kilometer reduces profits by 24 euros per vehicle. We find considerable heterogeneity across manufactures and countries.

Abstract: Previous analyses assumed that firms must surrender permits as they pollute. If so, then the price of permits may remain constant over measurable intervals if the government injects additional permits at a ceiling price or may even collapse if more permits are injected through an auction. However, no cap-and-trade program actually requires continual compliance. The three federal bills and California's AB-32, for example, instead require that firms surrender permits only periodically to cover their cumulative emissions since the last compliance period. Anticipated injections of additional permits during the compliance period should have different effects than under continual compliance. We develop a methodology for analyzing the effects of such permit injections. Using it, we explain why the sales provisions of one federal bill might generate a speculative attack in the permit market and why one provision of AB-32 may undermine the very existence of an equilibrium.

Abstract: This paper explores the policy options available to the United States for regulating greenhouse gas emissions from aircraft under existing law: the Clean Air Act (CAA). Europe has unilaterally and controversially moved to include aviation emissions in its Emissions Trading System. The United States can, however, allow its airlines to escape this requirement by imposing “equivalent” regulation. U.S. aviation emissions rules could also have significant environmental benefits and would limit domestic emissions beyond the reach of the European Union. With new legislation unlikely, the CAA is the only plausible vehicle for such regulation. Title II Part B of the CAA does grant EPA broad regulatory authority over aviation emissions, though this authority has not been used aggressively. EPA could impose meaningful aviation GHG limits and, by using performance standards, give airlines incentives to creatively comply. It might further be possible to allow some forms of emissions trading, though the law is unclear. Emissions by foreign airlines in the United States could be covered under the act, though international law might impose barriers.

Abstract: To address the climate change issue, developed nations have considered introducing carbon pricing mechanisms in the form of a carbon tax or an emissions trading scheme (ETS). Despite the small number of programs actually in operation, these mechanisms remain under active discussion in a number of countries, including Japan. Using an input–output model of the Japanese economy, this paper analyzes the effects of carbon pricing on Japan‘s industrial sector. We also examine the impact of a rebate program of the type proposed for energy intensive trade exposed (EITE) industries in U.S. legislation, the Waxman–Markey bill (H.R. 2454), and in the European Union‘s ETS. We find that a carbon pricing scheme would impose a disproportionate burden on a limited number of sectors—namely, pig iron, crude steel (converters), cement, and other EITE industries. We also find that the determinant of the increase in total cost differs among industries, depending on the relative inputs of directly combusted fossil fuel, electricity, or steam, as well as intermediate goods. Out of 401 industries, 23 would be eligible for rebates if a Waxman–Markey type of program were adopted in Japan. Specifically, the 85 percent rebate provided to eligible industries under H.R. 2454 would significantly reduce the cost of direct and indirect fossil fuel usage. The E.U. criteria identify 120 industries eligible for rebates. However, the E.U. program only covers direct emissions while the U.S. program includes indirect emissions as well. Overall, despite the differences in coverage, we find that the Waxman–Markey and E.U. rebate programs have roughly similar impacts in reducing the average burdens on EITE industries.

Abstract: The outcome of the December 2011 United Nations climate negotiations in Durban, South Africa, provides an important new opportunity to move toward an international climate policy architecture that is capable of delivering broad international participation and significant global CO2 emissions reductions at reasonable cost. We evaluate one important component of potential climate policy architecture for the post-Durban era: links among independent tradable permit systems for greenhouse gases. Because linkage reduces the cost of achieving given targets, there is tremendous pressure to link existing and planned cap-and-trade systems, and in fact, a number of links already or will soon exist. We draw on recent political and economic experience with linkage to evaluate potential roles that linkage may play in post-Durban international climate policy, both in a near-term, de facto architecture of indirect links between regional, national, and sub-national cap-and-trade systems, and in longer-term, more comprehensive bottom-up architecture of direct links. Although linkage will certainly help to reduce long-term abatement costs, it may also serve as an effective mechanism for building institutional and political structure to support a future climate agreement.

Abstract: California will enact an economy wide cap-and-trade program on CO2. Estimates of the value of tradable emissions allowances in the first year range from roughly $2.6 to $7.8 billion, when electricity and industry are covered under the program. Those sectors receive most of their allowances for free; electricity sector allowance value is directed to the benefit of ratepayers. In the first year a fraction of allowances, mostly with future year vintage, will be sold through an auction with a value of roughly $0.6 to $1.8 billion. That revenue will be returned to the California economy through appropriation by the legislature. Allowance auction revenue will grow five-fold in 2015 when transportation and natural gas are included. To whom does this revenue belong? This is the key unresolved issue in the design of the California program.

Abstract: California will implement a cap-and-trade program to limit emissions of carbon dioxide covering industry and electricity sector emissions in 2013, expanding to cover transportation and natural gas in 2015. Although cap-and-trade would increase annual electricity costs for the average customer by $30 to nearly $100, the allowance value created under the program can offset all of these costs and even reduce electricity bills. California’s Air Resources Board has directed electricity regulators to ensure this allowance value is used for the benefit of electricity ratepayers. This paper surveys four options: (1) reducing electricity bills; (2) sending equivalent revenue directly to households in proportion to costs; or (3) as equal payments per customer account; and (4) making investments to improve the electricity system and help reduce emissions. Under special consideration is this question: Who will receive the allowance value associated with the electricity sector? We explore the implications of three specific proposals.