Abstract: New Corporate Average Fuel Economy (CAFE) standards were recently passed in the United States with the twin goals of reducing greenhouse gas emissions and oil use. The new standards represent a dramatic change from recent policy. This paper examines the key features of the new rules, and compares them to previous CAFE standards in terms of flexibility and structure. The importance of consumer preferences and market forces on CAFE outcomes are identified. In the second part of the paper, the perspective of the consumer is explored. Consumer assessments of fuel economy savings with more fuel-efficient vehicles may be biased or incomplete, leading many to argue that there is an “energy efficiency gap” in consumer demand for vehicles. Reasons for such a gap, such as market failures, behavioral responses, and market barriers, are summarized. The implications for policy are discussed, including the role of combining CAFE with other policies.

Abstract: There is little evidence from impact evaluation studies of ambitious residential energy conservation programs, especially in developing countries. In this paper, I investigate the short- and long-term impacts of the most ambitious electricity conservation program to date. This was an innovative program of private incentives and conservation appeals implemented by the Brazilian government in 2001-2002 in response to supply shortages of over 20%. I nd that the program reduced average electricity consumption per customer by 25% over a nine-month period in affected areas. Importantly, the program reduced consumption by 12% in the long run. Such persistent effects, which arose mostly from behavioral adjustments, may substantially improve the cost-effectiveness of ambitious conservation programs. Finally, I show that a price elasticity estimated out-of-crisis would have to be increased fivefold to rationalize conservation efforts by the private incentives alone. Appeals to social preferences likely amplify consumers' responsiveness in times of crisis.

Abstract: Climate policymaking faces twin challenges of carbon leakage and public sector revenue requirements. A large literature advocates the use of carbon dioxide (CO2) pricing and recycling the revenues to lower distorting taxes as a way to minimize costs. In this paper, we explore the implications of labor tax interactions for the cost-effectiveness of border adjustments and other measures to cope with leakage. We find that, for plausible values of labor supply elasticities, the cost savings from revenue recycling are significant—from 15 to 25 percent. The cost savings from anti-leakage measures are generally smaller, but also significant, particularly for small coalitions or more binding reduction targets. Tax interactions further enhance the cost savings from border adjustments, but make other measures like rebates or exemptions less attractive.

Abstract: To address the climate change issue, developed nations have considered introducing carbon pricing mechanisms in the form of a carbon tax or an emissions trading scheme (ETS). Despite the small number of programs actually in operation, these mechanisms remain under active discussion in a number of countries, including Japan. Using an input–output model of the Japanese economy, this paper analyzes the effects of carbon pricing on Japan‘s industrial sector. We also examine the impact of a rebate program of the type proposed for energy intensive trade exposed (EITE) industries in U.S. legislation, the Waxman–Markey bill (H.R. 2454), and in the European Union‘s ETS. We find that a carbon pricing scheme would impose a disproportionate burden on a limited number of sectors—namely, pig iron, crude steel (converters), cement, and other EITE industries. We also find that the determinant of the increase in total cost differs among industries, depending on the relative inputs of directly combusted fossil fuel, electricity, or steam, as well as intermediate goods. Out of 401 industries, 23 would be eligible for rebates if a Waxman–Markey type of program were adopted in Japan. Specifically, the 85 percent rebate provided to eligible industries under H.R. 2454 would significantly reduce the cost of direct and indirect fossil fuel usage. The E.U. criteria identify 120 industries eligible for rebates. However, the E.U. program only covers direct emissions while the U.S. program includes indirect emissions as well. Overall, despite the differences in coverage, we find that the Waxman–Markey and E.U. rebate programs have roughly similar impacts in reducing the average burdens on EITE industries.

Abstract: California will enact an economy wide cap-and-trade program on CO2. Estimates of the value of tradable emissions allowances in the first year range from roughly $2.6 to $7.8 billion, when electricity and industry are covered under the program. Those sectors receive most of their allowances for free; electricity sector allowance value is directed to the benefit of ratepayers. In the first year a fraction of allowances, mostly with future year vintage, will be sold through an auction with a value of roughly $0.6 to $1.8 billion. That revenue will be returned to the California economy through appropriation by the legislature. Allowance auction revenue will grow five-fold in 2015 when transportation and natural gas are included. To whom does this revenue belong? This is the key unresolved issue in the design of the California program.

Abstract: The American Recovery and Reinvestment Act included more than $90 billion in strategic clean energy investments intended to promote job creation and promote deployment of low-carbon technologies. In terms of spending, the clean energy package has been described as the nation’s “biggest energy bill in history.” To provide a preliminary assessment of the Recovery Act’s clean energy package, this paper reviews the rationale, design, and implementation of the act. The paper surveys the policy principles for clean energy stimulus and describes the process of crafting the clean energy package during the 2008–2009 Presidential Transition. Then, the paper reviews the initial employment, economic activity, and energy outcomes associated with these energy investments and provides a more detailed case study on the Recovery Act’s support for renewable power through grants and loan guarantees. The paper concludes with lessons learned.

Abstract: A deposit-refund system combines a tax on product consumption with a rebate when the product or its packaging is returned for recycling. Deposit-refunds are used for beverage containers, lead-acid batteries, motor oil, tires, various hazardous materials, electronics, and more. In addition, researchers have shown that the approach can be used to address many other environmental problems beyond waste disposal. By imposing an up-front fee on consumption and subsidizing "green" inputs and mitigation activities, a deposit-refund may be able to efficiently control pollution in much the same way as a Pigovian tax. Theoretical models have shown that alternative waste disposal policies, such as virgin materials taxes, advance disposal fees, recycled content standards, and recycling subsidies are inferior to a deposit-refund. These results have been corroborated in calibrated models of U.S. waste and recycling. And in theoretical models that consider joint environmental problems and product design considerations, the deposit-refund continues to have much to recommend it as a component of an overall socially optimalset of policies. More empirical research into deposit-refund systems is needed, particularly the upstream systems used for many products. In these systems, the processors or collectors of recyclables—rather than consumers—receive the refund. Upstream systems may have lower transaction costs and better environmental outcomes than traditional downstream systems.

Abstract: This study estimates the impacts on a disaggregated set of California industries of introducing a carbon pricing policy within the state. Two time horizons are considered, the “very short run” and the “short run”. To limit adverse impacts on the state’s energy-intensive and trade-exposed (EITE) industries, we develop illustrative policy options involving free allowance allocations of emissions permits to particular industries and limited border adjustments on coal, natural gas, crude oil, and refined petroleum product imports, as well as on electricity. Overall, we find relatively small impacts on energy-intensive industries with the rebates in place. The average reduction in EITE output is 0.4 percent. There is, however, considerable variation in impacts among the EITE industries. We also find that the ability to pass on costs, as assumed in the short run case, dramatically reduces adverse profit impacts to less than 1.5 percent in most cases, regardless of the rebate scenario. Based on national-level modeling done outside of this study, we estimate that over the long term, the average EITE output losses with the rebates in place would be expected to be somewhat smaller than the results reported here.

Abstract: This paper explores the near-term effects on household expenditures of legislative cap-and-trade proposals that restrict greenhouse gas emissions. We evaluate optimistic and pessimistic assumptions about the uses of allowance value, compared to relatively predictable results from a cap-and-dividend approach. We find the allocation of emissions allowances is significantly more important to distributional outcomes than the initial costs or regional variation of costs. Older households—age 65 and older—incur relatively less cost than other age groups due to automatic inflation indexing of Social Security. Low income households spend a larger fraction of earnings on energy than wealthier households; however, the distribution of allowance value and indexing of government programs offset this spending. High-income households fare well because of allowance value that ultimately flows to capital owners. The largest burden as a percentage of income falls on middle-income households, which receive neither low-income rebates nor value through ownership of capital stock.

Abstract: Although the causes of the Deepwater Horizon spill are not yet conclusively identified, significant attention has focused on the safety-related policies and practices—often referred to as the safety culture—of BP and other firms involved in drilling the well. This paper defines and characterizes the economic and policy forces that affect safety culture and identifies reasons why those forces may ormay not be adequate or effective from the public’s perspective. Two potential justifications for policy intervention are that: a) not all of the social costs of a spill may be internalized by a firm; and b) there may be principal-agency problems within the firm, which could be reduced by external monitoring. The paper discusses five policies that could increase safety culture and monitoring: liability, financialresponsibility (a requirement that a firm’s assets exceed a threshold), government oversight, mandatory private insurance, and risk-based drilling fees. We find that although each policy has a positive effect on safety culture, there are important differences and interactions that must be considered. In particular, the latter three provide external monitoring. Furthermore, raising liability caps without mandating insurance or raising financial responsibility requirements could have a small effect on the safety culture of smallfirms that would declare bankruptcy in the event of a large spill. The paper concludes with policy recommendations for promoting stronger safety culture in offshore drilling; our preferred approach wouldbe to set a liability cap for each well equal to the worst-case social costs of a spill, and to requireinsurance up to the cap.

Abstract: Ground-level ozone remains a serious problem in the United States. Because ozone nonattainment is a summer problem, episodic rather than continuous controls of ozone precursors are possible. We evaluate the costs and effectiveness of an episodic scheme that requires people to buy permits to drive on high-ozone days. We estimate the demand function for permits based on a survey of 1,300 households in the Washington, DC, metropolitan area. Assuming that all vehicle owners comply with the scheme, the permit program would reduce volatile organic compounds (VOCs) by 50 tons and nitrogen oxides (NOx) by 42 tons per Code Red day at a permit price of $75. Allowing for noncompliance by 15 percent of respondents reduces the effectiveness of the scheme to 39 tons of VOCs and 33 tons of NOx per day. The cost per ozone season of achieving these reductions is approximately $9million (2008 USD). This compares favorably with permanent methods of reducing VOCs that cost $645 per ton per year.