Abstract: New Corporate Average Fuel Economy (CAFE) standards were recently passed in the United States with the twin goals of reducing greenhouse gas emissions and oil use. The new standards represent a dramatic change from recent policy. This paper examines the key features of the new rules, and compares them to previous CAFE standards in terms of flexibility and structure. The importance of consumer preferences and market forces on CAFE outcomes are identified. In the second part of the paper, the perspective of the consumer is explored. Consumer assessments of fuel economy savings with more fuel-efficient vehicles may be biased or incomplete, leading many to argue that there is an “energy efficiency gap” in consumer demand for vehicles. Reasons for such a gap, such as market failures, behavioral responses, and market barriers, are summarized. The implications for policy are discussed, including the role of combining CAFE with other policies.

Abstract: France, Germany, and Sweden link vehicle taxes to the carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions rates of passenger vehicles. Based on new vehicle registration data from 2005–2010, a vehicle’s tax is negatively correlated with its registrations. The effect is somewhat stronger in France than in Germany and Sweden. Taking advantage of the theoretical equivalence between an emissions rate standard and a CO2-based emissions rate tax, we estimate the effect on manufacturers’ profits of reducing emissions rates. For France, a decrease of 5 grams of CO2 per kilometer reduces profits by 24 euros per vehicle. We find considerable heterogeneity across manufactures and countries.

Abstract: “Cash-for-Clunkers” was a $3 billion program that attempted to stimulate the U.S. economy and improve the environment by encouraging consumers to retire older vehicles and purchase more fuel-efficient new vehicles. We investigate the effects of this program on new vehicle sales and the environment. Using Canada as the control group in a difference-in-differences framework, we find that the program increased new vehicle sales by about 0.36 million during July and August of 2009, implying that approximately 45 percent of the spending went to consumers who would have purchased a new vehicle anyway. Our results suggest no gain in sales beyond 2009 and hence no meaningful stimulus to the economy. In addition, the program will reduce CO2 emissions by only 9 to 28.4 million tons, implying a cost per ton ranging from $91 to $288 even after accounting for reduced criteria pollutants.

Abstract: Ground-level ozone remains a serious problem in the United States. Because ozone nonattainment is a summer problem, episodic rather than continuous controls of ozone precursors are possible. We evaluate the costs and effectiveness of an episodic scheme that requires people to buy permits to drive on high-ozone days. We estimate the demand function for permits based on a survey of 1,300 households in the Washington, DC, metropolitan area. Assuming that all vehicle owners comply with the scheme, the permit program would reduce volatile organic compounds (VOCs) by 50 tons and nitrogen oxides (NOx) by 42 tons per Code Red day at a permit price of $75. Allowing for noncompliance by 15 percent of respondents reduces the effectiveness of the scheme to 39 tons of VOCs and 33 tons of NOx per day. The cost per ozone season of achieving these reductions is approximately $9million (2008 USD). This compares favorably with permanent methods of reducing VOCs that cost $645 per ton per year.

Abstract: Most developed and developing country governments levy taxes on gasoline and diesel fuel used by motor vehicles. However, outside of the United States and Europe, automobile and heavy truckexternalities have not been quantified, so policymakers have little guidance on whether prevailing tax rates are anywhere close to their corrective levels. This paper develops a general approach for roughlygauging the magnitude of motor vehicle externalities, and hence the corrective tax on gasoline and diesel, for individual countries, based on pooling local data sources with extrapolations from U.S. data. The analysis is illustrated for the case of Chile, though it could be readily applied to other countries with appropriate data collection.

Abstract: This paper provides an updated assessment of economically efficient taxes on gasoline (used by light-duty vehicles) and diesel (used by heavy-duty trucks) to address various highway externalities in the United States. The (second-best) corrective fuel taxes are estimated, and we discuss the implications of fuel economy regulations and prospective (nationwide) controls on carbon emissions. We also examine how optimal fuel taxes depend on how they interact with the broader fiscal system. Our baseline estimates of the corrective taxes on gasoline and diesel are $1.23 and $1.15 per gallon, respectively. However, optimal fuel taxes can be substantially higher if extra revenues are used to reduce distortionary income taxes, or substantially lower if revenues are not used to enhance economic efficiency.

Abstract: Although fuel taxes are a practical means of curbing vehicular air pollution, congestion, and accidents in developing countries—all of which are typically major problems—they are often opposed on distributional grounds. Yet few studies have investigated fuel tax incidence in a developing country context. We use household survey data and income-outcome coefficients to analyze fuel tax incidence inCosta Rica. We find that the effect of a 10 percent fuel price hike through direct spending on gasoline would be progressive, its effect through spending on diesel—both directly and via bus transportation—would be regressive (mainly because poorer households rely heavily on buses), and its effect through spending on goods other than fuel and bus transportation would be relatively small, albeit regressive.Finally, we find that although the overall effect of a 10 percent fuel price hike through all types of direct and indirect spending would be slightly regressive, the magnitude of this combined effect would be modest. We conclude that distributional concerns need not rule out using fuel taxes to address pressing public health and safety problems, particularly if gasoline and diesel taxes can be differentiated.

Abstract: Although fuel taxes are a practical means of curbing vehicular air pollution, congestion, and accidents in developing countries—all of which are typically major problems—they are often opposed ondistributional grounds. Yet few studies have investigated fuel tax incidence in a developing country context. We use household survey data and income-outcome coefficients to analyze fuel tax incidence inCosta Rica. We find that the effect of a 10 percent fuel price hike through direct spending on gasoline would be progressive, its effect through spending on diesel—both directly and via bus transportation—would be regressive (mainly because poorer households rely heavily on buses), and its effect through spending on goods other than fuel and bus transportation would be relatively small, albeit regressive.Finally, we find that although the overall effect of a 10 percent fuel price hike through all types of direct and indirect spending would be slightly regressive, the magnitude of this combined effect would be modest. We conclude that distributional concerns need not rule out using fuel taxes to address pressing public health and safety problems, particularly if gasoline and diesel taxes can be differentiated.

Abstract: This paper examines the unexplored link between the prevalence of overweight and obesity and vehicle demand in the United States. Exploring annual sales data of new passenger vehicles at the model level in 48 U.S. counties from 1999 to 2005, we find that a 10 percentage point increase in the rate of overweight and obesity reduces the average MPG of new vehicles demanded by 2.5 percent: an effect that requires a 30 cent increase in gasoline prices to counteract. Our findings suggest that policies to reduce overweight and obesity can have additional benefits for energy security and the environment.