Abstract: Biomass energy is expected to play a major role in the substitution of renewable energy sources for fossil fuels over the next several decades. The US Energy Information Administration (EIA 2012) forecasts increases in the share of biomass in US energy production from 8 percent in 2009 to 15 percent by 2035. The general view has been that carbon emitted into the atmosphere from biological materials is carbon neutral—part of a closed loop whereby plant regrowth simply recaptures the carbon emissions associated with the energy produced. Recently this view has been challenged, and the US Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) is considering regulations to be applied to biomass energy carbon emissions. A basic approach for analyses of environmental impacts has been the use of life cycle assessment (LCA), a methodology for assessing and measuring the environmental impact of a product over its lifetime—from raw material extraction through materials processing, manufacture, distribution, use, repair and maintenance, and disposal or recycling. However, LCA approaches vary, and the results of alternative methodologies often differ (Helin et al. 2012). This study investigates and compares the implications of these alternative approaches for emissions from wood biomass energy, the carbon footprint, and also highlights the differences in LCA environmental impacts.

Abstract: Several recent studies have used simulation models to quantify the potential effects of recent environmental regulations on power plants, including the Mercury and Air Toxics Standards (MATS), one of the US Environmental Protection Agency’s most expensive regulations. These studies have produced inconsistent results about the effects on the industry, making general conclusions difficult. We attempt to reconcile these differences by representing the variety of assumptions in these studies within a common modeling platform. We find that the assumptions, and their differences from the way MATS will be implemented, make a substantial impact on projected retirement of coal-fired capacity and generation, investments that are required, and emissions reductions. Almost uniformly, the actual regulation, when examined in its final form and in isolation, provides more flexibility than is represented in most models. We find this leads to a smaller impact on the composition of the electricity generating fleet than most studies have predicted.

Abstract: Several different economic models have been applied to try to understand how new regulations by the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) could impact coal-fired generation in the United States as well as the electricity system as a whole. This paper provides an overview of many of the key studies and the models used to analyze the potential impacts of EPA’s rules. The regulations surveyed include the Cross-State Air Pollution Rule (CSAPR), the Mercury and Air Toxics Standards (MATS), the proposed Clean Water Act (CWA) Section 316(b) rule, and the proposed Coal Combustion Residuals (CCR) rule. The models generally agree that these regulations will result in coal plant retirements, though there is far less agreement on how much generation may retire. Assumptions about the price of natural gas and the expected stringency of regulations play a key role in determining modeling results. The models provide useful guidance for policymakers when considering the potential impact of EPA regulation.

Abstract: In 2009, President Obama pledged that, by 2020, the United States would achieve reductions in greenhouse gas emissions of 17 percent from 2005 levels. With the failure of Congress to adopt comprehensive climate legislation in 2010, the feasibility of the pledge was put in doubt. However, we find the United States is near to reaching this goal; currently, the country is on course to achieve reductions of 16.3 percent from 2005 levels in 2020. Three factors contribute to this outcome: greenhouse gas regulations under the Clean Air Act, secular trends including changes in relative fuel prices and energy efficiency, and subnational efforts. Nonetheless, global emissions likely will be greater than if comprehensive climate legislation had passed because of the absence of offsets, and at this point the United States is expected to fail to meet its financing commitments under the Copenhagen Accord for 2020.

Abstract: Two decades have passed since the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990 launched a grand experiment in market-based environmental policy: the SO2 cap-and-trade system. That system performed well but created four striking ironies. First, by creating this system to reduce SO2 emissions to curb acid rain, the government did the right thing for the wrong reason. Second, a substantial source of this system’s cost-effectiveness was an unanticipated consequence of earlier railroad deregulation. Third, it is ironic that cap-and-trade has come to be demonized by conservative politicians in recent years, since this market-based, cost-effective policy innovation was initially championed and implemented by Republican administrations. Fourth, court decisions and subsequent regulatory responses have led to the collapse of the SO2 market, demonstrating that what the government gives, the government can take away.

Abstract: While the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) is in the process of regulating greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions under its Clean Air Act (CAA) authority, Congress has considered several different bills that would preempt CAA regulation of GHGs and replace it with a comprehensive national climate policy. Policymakers should be aware that there are other existing federal statutes granting GHG regulatory authority, and new legislation would likely preempt them as well. This paper surveys these other statutes in order to highlight existing federal authority that might be given up with the passage of a new comprehensive bill. It explores the possibility of direct regulation of GHGs under the Clean Water Act (CWA), along with federal authority to block projects that contribute to climate change under the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) and conservation statutes such as the Endangered Species Act (ESA). Newer statutes like the Energy Independence and Security Act (EISA) mandate narrower regulation, but they are also considered here.

Abstract: To help inform pollution control policies in the Indian electricity sector we estimate the health damages associated with particulate matter, sulfur dioxide (SO2), and nitrogen oxides (NOx) from individual coal-fired power plants. We calculate the damages per ton of pollutant for each of 89 plants and compute total damages in 2008, by pollutant, for 63 plants. We estimate health damages by combining data on power plant emissions of particulate matter, SO2 and NOx with reduced-form intake fraction models that link emissions to changes in population-weighted ambient concentrations of fine particles. Concentration-response functions for fine particles from Pope et al. (2002) are used to estimate premature cardiopulmonary deaths associated with air emissions for persons 30 and older. Our results suggest that 75 percent of premature deaths are associated with fine particles that result from SO2 emissions. After characterizing the distribution of premature mortality across plants we calculate the health benefits and cost-per-life saved of the flue-gas desulfurization unit installed at the Dahanu power plant in Maharashtra and the health benefits of coal washing at the Rihand power plant in Uttar Pradesh.

Abstract: California will enact an economy wide cap-and-trade program on CO2. Estimates of the value of tradable emissions allowances in the first year range from roughly $2.6 to $7.8 billion, when electricity and industry are covered under the program. Those sectors receive most of their allowances for free; electricity sector allowance value is directed to the benefit of ratepayers. In the first year a fraction of allowances, mostly with future year vintage, will be sold through an auction with a value of roughly $0.6 to $1.8 billion. That revenue will be returned to the California economy through appropriation by the legislature. Allowance auction revenue will grow five-fold in 2015 when transportation and natural gas are included. To whom does this revenue belong? This is the key unresolved issue in the design of the California program.

Abstract: Implementation of new environmental regulations in the electricity industry has triggered concerns about system reliability. We find these regulations are unlikely to create the shock to the system as some worry. They lead to little change in generation capacity. The large costs associated with investments in pollution control technologies are partially offset by a decrease in the cost burden associated with tradable emissions allowances. The combined effects contribute to a 1 percent increase in retail electricity prices and a decrease in producer profits of about $3–$5 billion in 2020. Though it varies across scenarios and regions, over the simulation horizon, consumers pay approximately 70 percent of total costs. In 2020, for example, total annual costs are between $6.6 billion and $7.1 billion. The investment in pollution controls leads to substantial reductions in emissions of mercury and sulfur dioxide.

Abstract: The confluence of several pending environmental rulemakings will require billions of dollars of investment across the industry and changes in the operation of facilities. These changes may lead to retirement of some facilities, and there has been much debate about their potential effects on electricity reliability. Only very exceptional circumstances would trigger supply disruptions; however, the changes may affect electricity prices, the generation mix, and industry revenues. Coincident with these new rules, expectations about natural gas prices and future electricity demand growth are changing in ways that also will have substantial effects on the industry. This paper addresses these two sets of issues using a detailed simulation model of the U.S. electricity market. The findings suggest that recent downward adjustments in natural gas prices and electricty demand projections have a substantially larger impact on electricity prices and generation mix than do the new environmental rules.

Abstract: In the past two decades, rapid population and economic growth on the U.S.–Mexico border has spurred a dramatic increase in electricity demand. In response, American energy multinationals have built power plants just south of the border that export most of their electricity to the United States. This development has stirred considerable controversy because these plants effectively skirt U.S. environmental air pollution regulations in a severely degraded international airshed. Yet to our knowledge, this concern has not been subjected to rigorous scrutiny. This paper uses a suite of air dispersion, health impacts, and valuation models to assess the human health damages in the United States and Mexico caused by air emissions from two power-exporting plants in Mexicali, Baja California. We find that these emissions have limited but nontrivial health impacts, mostly by exacerbating particulate pollution in the United States, and we value these damages at more than half a million dollars per year. These findings demonstrate that power-exporting plants can have cross-border health effects and bolster the case for systematically evaluating their environmental impacts.

Abstract: In the past two decades, rapid population and economic growth on the U.S.–Mexico border has spurred a dramatic increase in electricity demand. In response, American energy multinationals have built power plants just south of the border that export most of their electricity to the United States. This development has stirred considerable controversy because these plants effectively skirt U.S. environmental air pollution regulations in a severely degraded international airshed. Yet to our knowledge, this concern has not been subjected to rigorous scrutiny. This paper uses a suite of air dispersion, health impacts, and valuation models to assess the human health damages in the United States and Mexico caused by air emissions from two power-exporting plants in Mexicali, Baja California. We find that these emissions have limited but nontrivial health impacts, mostly by exacerbating particulate pollution in the United States, and we value these damages at more than half a million dollars per year. These findings demonstrate that power-exporting plants can have cross-border health effects and bolster the case for systematically evaluating their environmental impacts.

Abstract: The U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) continues to move ahead with regulation of greenhouse gas emissions under the Clean Air Act (CAA). Previous work has indicated that basic forms of compliance flexibility—trading—appear to be legally permissible under the relevant part (Section 111) of the CAA. This paper takes a close look at more expansive and ambitious types of flexibility: trading between different kinds of sources, biomass co-firing, and, above all, offsets. It concludes that most types of such extended flexibility are either legally incompatible with the CAA, or so legally problematic that EPA is unlikely to adopt them. This has important implications for both the costs of CAA climate policy and the level of environmental benefits that are achievable. It also creates tension between CAA climate policy and state-level policies, such as California’s, that aim to include various forms of extended flexibility.

Abstract: In their recent paper, “Efficient Pollution Regulation: Getting the Prices Right” (henceforth, EPR), Muller and Mendelsohn describe a broader, more appealing concept of efficiency that incorporates information on damages caused by emissions from specific sources: “The science and economics related to pollution control”, they write, “have advanced to the point where regulations can now move from cost-effectiveness to efficiency.” We argue that despite the appeal of the EPR solution, its conclusion that source-specific marginal damage estimates are ready for use in regulations is simply incompatible with the empirical evidence presented in EPR. In particular, we explore the implications of the EPR finding of negative marginal damages from NOx emissions for many heavily populated counties. The associated nonconvexities, we show, imply that the source-specific trading ratios that EPR advocates lead to unattractive outcomes not likely to be efficient. We also discuss how the EPR assumption that the regulators know damages with certainty oversimplifies key aspects of efficient air pollution regulation.