Abstract: New Corporate Average Fuel Economy (CAFE) standards were recently passed in the United States with the twin goals of reducing greenhouse gas emissions and oil use. The new standards represent a dramatic change from recent policy. This paper examines the key features of the new rules, and compares them to previous CAFE standards in terms of flexibility and structure. The importance of consumer preferences and market forces on CAFE outcomes are identified. In the second part of the paper, the perspective of the consumer is explored. Consumer assessments of fuel economy savings with more fuel-efficient vehicles may be biased or incomplete, leading many to argue that there is an “energy efficiency gap” in consumer demand for vehicles. Reasons for such a gap, such as market failures, behavioral responses, and market barriers, are summarized. The implications for policy are discussed, including the role of combining CAFE with other policies.

Abstract: There is little evidence from impact evaluation studies of ambitious residential energy conservation programs, especially in developing countries. In this paper, I investigate the short- and long-term impacts of the most ambitious electricity conservation program to date. This was an innovative program of private incentives and conservation appeals implemented by the Brazilian government in 2001-2002 in response to supply shortages of over 20%. I nd that the program reduced average electricity consumption per customer by 25% over a nine-month period in affected areas. Importantly, the program reduced consumption by 12% in the long run. Such persistent effects, which arose mostly from behavioral adjustments, may substantially improve the cost-effectiveness of ambitious conservation programs. Finally, I show that a price elasticity estimated out-of-crisis would have to be increased fivefold to rationalize conservation efforts by the private incentives alone. Appeals to social preferences likely amplify consumers' responsiveness in times of crisis.

Abstract: The failure of consumers to make seemingly cost-effective investments in energy efficiency is commonly referred to as the energy efficiency gap. We review the most recent literature relevant to the energy efficiency gap and in particular discuss what the latest insights from behavioral economics might mean for the gap. We find that engineering studies may overestimate the size of the gap by failing to account for all costs and neglecting particular types of economic behavior. Nonetheless, empirical evidence suggests that market failures such as asymmetric information and agency problems affect efficiency decisions and contribute to the gap. Behavioral anomalies have been shown to affect economic decisionmaking in a variety of other contexts and are being increasingly cited as an explanation for the gap. The relative contributions of the various explanations for the gap differ across energy users and energy uses. This heterogeneity poses challenges for policymakers, but also could help elucidate when different policy interventions will most likely be cost-effective. If behavioral anomalies can be more cleanly linked to energy efficiency investments, then policymakers will face new challenges in performing welfare analysis of energy efficiency policies.