Abstract: Presently, the mountain gorilla in Rwanda, Uganda, and the Democratic Republic of Congo is endangered mainly by poaching and habitat loss. This paper sets out to investigate the possible resolution of poaching involving the local community by using benefit sharing schemes with local communities. Using a bioeconomic model, the paper demonstrates that the current revenue sharing scheme yields suboptimal conservation outcomes. It is shown, however, that a performance-linked benefit sharing scheme in which the Park Agency makes payment to the local community based on the growth of the gorilla stock can achieve socially optimal conservation. This scheme renders unnecessary poaching effort by the local community. Therefore, it becomes unnecessary to impose poaching fines and anti-poaching enforcement on the local community. Given the huge financial outlay requirements for the ideal benefit sharing scheme, the Park Agencies in Central Africa could reap more financial benefits for use in conservation if they employ an oligopolistic pricing strategy for gorilla tourism.

Abstract: Natural ecosystems provide a variety of benefits to society, known as “ecosystem services.” Fundamental to the provision of ecosystem services in a region is its underlying biodiversity, i.e., the wealth and variety of plants, animals, and microorganisms. Because the benefits from ecosystem services and biodiversity are not valued in market exchanges, private landowners tend to undersupply them. We compare and contrast the different approaches taken to providing ecosystem services on private land in three federal programs—the Endangered Species Act, the Conservation Reserve Program, and Section 404 of the Clean Water Act. The Endangered Species Act (ESA) places restrictions on land uses for private landowners if endangered species, or critical habitats for endangered species, are found on their properties. The Conservation Reserve Program (CRP) compensates farmers for removing valuable property from agricultural production to preserve wildlife habitat, water and soil quality, and other ecosystem values. Section 404 of the Clean Water Act prohibits destruction or damage to wetlands, unless individuals buy credits for equivalent wetlands created by third parties—so-called “wetlands mitigation banks.” These three policies run the gamut from a command-and-control regulatory approach to a “payment for ecosystem services” option. We summarize the economics literature on key findings from these programs.

Jim Boyd, Ted Heintz, Robin O'Malley