Abstract: To address the climate change issue, developed nations have considered introducing carbon pricing mechanisms in the form of a carbon tax or an emissions trading scheme (ETS). Despite the small number of programs actually in operation, these mechanisms remain under active discussion in a number of countries, including Japan. Using an input–output model of the Japanese economy, this paper analyzes the effects of carbon pricing on Japan‘s industrial sector. We also examine the impact of a rebate program of the type proposed for energy intensive trade exposed (EITE) industries in U.S. legislation, the Waxman–Markey bill (H.R. 2454), and in the European Union‘s ETS. We find that a carbon pricing scheme would impose a disproportionate burden on a limited number of sectors—namely, pig iron, crude steel (converters), cement, and other EITE industries. We also find that the determinant of the increase in total cost differs among industries, depending on the relative inputs of directly combusted fossil fuel, electricity, or steam, as well as intermediate goods. Out of 401 industries, 23 would be eligible for rebates if a Waxman–Markey type of program were adopted in Japan. Specifically, the 85 percent rebate provided to eligible industries under H.R. 2454 would significantly reduce the cost of direct and indirect fossil fuel usage. The E.U. criteria identify 120 industries eligible for rebates. However, the E.U. program only covers direct emissions while the U.S. program includes indirect emissions as well. Overall, despite the differences in coverage, we find that the Waxman–Markey and E.U. rebate programs have roughly similar impacts in reducing the average burdens on EITE industries.

Abstract: The effects of a carbon price on U.S. industries are likely to change over time as firms and customers gradually adjust to new prices. The effects will also depend on offsetting policies to compensate losers and the number of countries implementing comparable policies. We examine the effects of a $15/ton CO2 price, including Waxman-Markey-type allocations, on a disaggregated set of industries, over four time horizons—the very-short-, short-, medium-, and long-runs—distinguished by the ability of firms to raise output prices, change their input mix, and reallocate capital. We find that if firms cannot pass on higher costs, the loss in profits in a number of energy-intensive, trade-exposed (EITE) industries will be substantial. When output prices can rise to reflect higher energy costs, the reduction in profits is substantially smaller, and the offsetting policies in H.R. 2454 reduce output and profit losses even more. Over the medium- and long-terms, however, when more adjustments occur, the impact on output is more varied due to general equilibrium effects. We find that the use of the output-based rebates and other allocations in H.R. 2454 can substantially offset the output losses over all four time frames considered. Trade or "competitiveness" effects from the carbon price explain a significant portion of the fall in output for EITE sectors, but in absolute terms, the trade impacts are modest and can be reduced or even reversed with the subsidies. The subsidies are less effective, however, in preventing emissions leakage to countries not adopting carbon policies. Roughly half of U.S. trade-related leakage to non-policy countries can be explained by changes in the volume of trade and the other half by higher emissions intensities induced by lower world fuel prices.

Abstract: Current and proposed greenhouse gas cap-and-trade systems allow regulated entities to offset abatement requirements by paying unregulated entities to abate. These offsets from unregulated entitiesare believed to contain system costs and stabilize allowance prices. However, the supply of offsets is highly uncertain. Furthermore, the offset supply uncertainty may be correlated with other sources ofuncertainty in emissions trading systems. This paper presents a model that incorporates both uncertainties in the supply of offsets and in abatement costs. Using numerical methods we solve the model under avariety of parameter settings, including a system that includes allowance price controls. We find that as uncertainty in offsets and uncertainty in abatement costs become more negatively correlated, expected abatement plus offset purchase costs increase, as does the variability in allowance prices and emissions from the regulated sector. Imposing an allowance price collar that limits the upper and lower cost substantially mitigates cost increases as well as the variability in prices and emissions, while roughly maintaining expected environmental outcomes.

Abstract: We use a stochastic dynamic framework to compare price collars (price ceilings and floors) in a cap-and-trade system. Sources of uncertainty include shocks to baseline emissions, affectingcorresponding abatement costs, and shocks to the supply of offsets. We consider a continuum between soft collars, which have a limited volume of additional emission allowances (a reserve) available at theprice ceiling, and hard collars, which provide an unlimited supply of additional allowances, thereby preventing allowance prices from exceeding the price ceiling. For all cases considered, we set the price floors and ceiling such that the expected cumulative emissions net of offsets are equal to the cumulative allowances. Consequently, increasing the size of the allowance reserve requires higher price ceilings and floors, and a lower probability of reaching the ceiling. Across most parameter values examined, we find that increasing the size of the allowance reserve leads to lower expected net present values of compliance costs, although the differences are not large. However, when offset supply shocks are highly persistent and exhibit strong (negative) correlation with baseline emission shocks, hard collars deliver noticeably lower expected costs, though with a wider range of emission outcomes than the soft collars.

Abstract: This study estimates the impacts on a disaggregated set of California industries of introducing a carbon pricing policy within the state. Two time horizons are considered, the “very short run” and the “short run”. To limit adverse impacts on the state’s energy-intensive and trade-exposed (EITE) industries, we develop illustrative policy options involving free allowance allocations of emissions permits to particular industries and limited border adjustments on coal, natural gas, crude oil, and refined petroleum product imports, as well as on electricity. Overall, we find relatively small impacts on energy-intensive industries with the rebates in place. The average reduction in EITE output is 0.4 percent. There is, however, considerable variation in impacts among the EITE industries. We also find that the ability to pass on costs, as assumed in the short run case, dramatically reduces adverse profit impacts to less than 1.5 percent in most cases, regardless of the rebate scenario. Based on national-level modeling done outside of this study, we estimate that over the long term, the average EITE output losses with the rebates in place would be expected to be somewhat smaller than the results reported here.

Abstract: This study compares and contrasts regulatory and related practices—in particular, regulatory decisionmaking, risk assessment and planning processes, inspection and compliance, and organization structure, budgets, and training—of the Minerals Management Service (MMS, now the Bureau of Ocean Energy Management, Regulation, and Enforcement, or BOEMRE) with those of the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) and the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). Comparing MMS practices withthose of other federal agencies that also manage low-probability but high-consequence environmental risks provides a basis for identifying opportunities for enhancing regulatory capacity and safety performance in managing deepwater energy exploration and production. Our research finds important differences in processes for setting standards; peer review contribution to the rulemaking process; establishment of tolerable risk thresholds; and training of key staff. The paper concludes with several recommendations for how various EPA and FAA practices might be modified and used at BOEMRE to strengthen its regulatory and risk management processes.

Abstract: The effects of a carbon price on U.S. industries are likely to change over time as firms and customers gradually adjust to new prices. The effects will also depend on the number of countries implementing the policy as well as offsetting policies to compensate losers. We examine the effects of a $15/ton CO2 price, including Waxman-Markey-type allocations to vulnerable industries, over four time horizons—the very short-, short-, medium-, and long-runs—distinguished by the ability of firms to raise output prices, change their input mix, and reallocate capital. We find that if firms cannot pass on higher costs, the loss in profits in a number of industries will indeed be large. When output prices can rise to reflect higher energy costs, the reduction in output and profits is substantially smaller. Over the medium- and long-terms, however, when more adjustments occur, the impact on output is more varied due to general equilibrium effects. The use of the H.R. 2454 rebates can substantially offset the output losses over all four time frames considered. We also consider competitiveness and leakage effects—changes in trade flows and changes in emissions in the rest of the world. We examine two measures of leakage: ?trade-related? leakage that accounts for both the increased volume of net imports into the U.S. as well as the higher carbon intensity of these imports, and a broader leakage measure that includes the effect of increased fossil fuel consumption in countries not undertaking a carbon-pricing policy.

Abstract: The effects of a carbon price on U.S. industries are likely to change over time as firms and customers gradually adjust to new prices. The effects will also depend on the number of countries implementing the policy as well as offsetting policies to compensate losers. We examine the effects of a $15/ton CO2 price, including Waxman-Markey-type allocations to vulnerable industries, over four time horizons—the very short-, short-, medium-, and long-runs—distinguished by the ability of firms to raise output prices, change their input mix, and reallocate capital. We find that if firms cannot pass on higher costs, the loss in profits in a number of industries will indeed be large. When output prices can rise to reflect higher energy costs, the reduction in output and profits is substantially smaller. Over the medium- and long-terms, however, when more adjustments occur, the impact on output is more varied due to general equilibrium effects. The use of the H.R. 2454 rebates can substantially offset the output losses over all four time frames considered. We also consider competitiveness and leakage effects—changes in trade flows and changes in emissions in the rest of the world. We examine two measures of leakage: “trade-related” leakage that accounts for both the increased volume of net imports into the U.S. as well as the higher carbon intensity of these imports, and a broader leakage measure that includes the effect of increased fossil fuel consumption in countries not undertaking a carbon-pricing policy.

Abstract: We compare several emissions reduction instruments, including quantity policies with banking and borrowing, price policies, and hybrid policies (safety valve and price collar), using a dynamic model with stochastic baseline emissions. The instruments are compared under the design goal of obtaining the same expected cumulative emissions across all options. Based on simulation analysis with the model parameterized to values relevant to proposed U.S. climate mitigation policies, we find that restrictions on banking and borrowing, including the provision of interest rates on the borrowings, can severely limit the value of the policy, depending on the regulator-chosen allowance issuance path. Although emissions taxes generally provide the lowest expected abatement costs, a cap-and-trade system combined with either a safety valve or a price collar can be designed to provide expected abatement costs near those of a tax, but with lower emissions variance than a tax. Consistently, a price collar is more cost-effective than a safety valve for a given expected cumulative emissions outcome because it encourages inexpensive abatement when abatement costs decline.

Abstract: This paper informs the discussion of carbon price policies by examining the potential for adverse impacts on domestic industries, with a focus on detailed sector-level analysis. The assumed policyscenario involves a unilateral economy-wide $10/ton CO2 charge without accompanying border tax adjustments or other complementary policies. Four modeling approaches are developed as a proxy for thedifferent time horizons over which firms can pass through added costs, change input mix, adopt new technologies, and reallocate capital. Overall, we find that a readily identifiable set of industries experience particularly adverse impacts as measured by reduced output and that the relative burdens on different industries are remarkably consistent across the four time horizons. Output rebounds considerably over longer time horizons, and the adverse impacts on profits diminish even more rapidly in most cases. Overthe short term employment losses mirror output declines, while gains in other industries fully offset the losses over the longer horizons. At the same time, leakage abroad is considerable in some sectors, particularly when reductions in exports are considered.

Abstract: This paper investigates the potential for systematic errors in the Energy Information Administration’s (EIA) widely used Annual Energy Outlook, focusing on the near- to midterm projections of energy demand as measured in physical quantities. Overall, based on an analysis of the EIA’s 22-year projection record, we find a fairly modest but persistent tendency to underestimate total energy demand by an average of 2 percent per year over the one- to five-year projection horizon after controlling for projection errors in gross domestic product, oil prices, and heating/cooling degree days.For the 14 individual fuels/consuming sectors routinely reported by the EIA, we observe a great deal of directional consistency in the error patterns over time, ranging up to 7 percent per year. Electric utility renewables, electric utility natural gas, transportation distillate, and residential electricity all show significant biases, on average, across the full five year projection horizon examined. Projections for certain other fuels/consuming sectors have significant unexplained errors for selected time horizons.Independent evaluation of this type can be useful for validating ongoing analytic efforts and for prioritizing future model revisions.

Abstract: Despite the growing importance of voluntary programs as tools for environmental management, they have been subject to quite limited evaluation. Program evaluation in the absence of randomized experiments is difficult because the decision to participate may not be random and, in particular, may be correlated with the outcomes. The present study is designed to overcome these problems by gauging the environmental effectiveness of two voluntary climate change programs—the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency’s Climate Wise program and the U.S. Department of Energy’s Voluntary Reporting of Greenhouse Gases Program, or 1605(b)—with particular attention to the participation decision and how various assumptions affect estimates of program outcomes. For both programs, the analysis focuses on manufacturing firms and uses confidential census data to create a comparison group and to measure outcomes (expenditures on fuel and electricity).Overall, we find that that the effects from Climate Wise and 1605(b) on fuel and electricity expenditures are no more than 10 percent and probably less than 5 percent. Virtually no evidence suggests a statistically significant effect of either Climate Wise or 1605(b) on fuel costs. Some evidence suggests that participation in Climate Wise led to a slight (3–5 percent) increase in electricity costs that vanished after two years. Stronger evidence suggests that participation in 1605(b) led to a slight (4–8 percent) decrease in electricity costs that persisted for at least three years.

Abstract: This paper examines the United States’ experience with environmental decentralization, focusing on the relationship between the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and the states. It outlines the factors that are considered in determining the appropriate degree of decentralization, the advantages and disadvantages of decentralization, how the EPA-state relationship has evolved over the years, and the structural mechanisms used to ensure that there is a high degree of performance by EPA and the states in administering the programs. Program-specific examples of the EPA-state relationship are also provided.

Abstract: Federal agencies in the United States are required to prepare regulatory impact analyses (RIAs) for every major regulatory action they undertake. Increasingly, other OECD countries are imposing similar requirements. However, there has been little examination of the quality of these documents or of the uses to which they have been put in the regulatory process or elsewhere. In this paper we survey previous efforts to evaluate RIAs and find a fair amount of evaluation of RIAs as stand-alone documents, but much less evaluation of their contribution to producing better regulations.

Abstract: The Asian Development Bank has sponsored research on market-based instruments for managing pollution in Metro Manila, Philippines, where air quality is seriously degraded. This report offers three policy options for reducing particulate emissions and their precursors. For stationary sources, we recommend an emissions fee that creates efficient financial incentives to reduce emissions while raising revenues for monitoring and enforcement activities. For mobile sources, we propose a pilot diesel retrofit program using a low-cost technology that is effective at existing 2,000 ppm sulfur content. Second, we recommmend a charge on the sulfur content of diesel fuel to encourage meeting and surpassing the 500 ppm standard to allow for more advanced particulate trap technologies. Although better data are needed—both for designing controls and for evaluating their efficacy—much can be learned just by implementing these programs, so we make recommendations for starting points.

Abstract: Estimates of marginal abatement costs for reducing carbon emissions derived from majoreconomic-energy models vary widely. Controlling for policy regimes, we use meta-analysis to examinethe importance of structural modeling choices in explaining differences in estimates. The analysisindicates that particular assumptions about perfectly foresighted consumers and Armington tradeelasticities generate lower estimates of marginal abatement costs. Other choices are associated with highercost estimates, including perfectly mobile capital, inclusion of a backstop technology, and greaterdisaggregation among regions and sectors. Some features, such as greater technological detail, seem lesssignificant. Understanding the importance of key modeling assumptions, as well as the way the modelsare used to estimate abatement costs, can help guide the development of consistent modeling practices forpolicy evaluation.

Abstract: Improved technology is often cited as a means to alter the otherwise difficult trade-off between the economic burden of regulation and environmental damage. Focusing on energy-saving technologies that mitigate the threat of climate change, we find that both energy prices and financial health influence technology adoption among a sample of industrial plants in four heavily polluting sectors. Based on a model linking technology adoption to growth in aggregate efficiency, we estimate that a doubling of energy prices, after raising the growth rate to 2.1%, would require slightly more than 50 years to generate a 50% improvement in aggregate efficiency relative to the baseline forecast.

Abstract: To reduce carbon emissions worldwide, it makes sense to consider the possibility of developed countries paying for carbon reductions in developing countries. Developing countries may be interested in such activities if the ancillary air pollution benefits are large.This paper reports on an RFF survey of the emissions benefits (and costs) of reducing sulfur dioxide (SO₂) emissions from small, coal-burning boilers in Taiyuan, an industrial, northern Chinese city that recently banned uncontrolled coal combustion in certain small boilers in the downtown area.We find significant carbon benefits in percentage terms - on the order of 50% to 95% reduction - associated with this SO₂ control policy, with large reduction potential elsewhere in Taiyuan and China. While the cost for boilers that switched out of coal was almost $3,600 per ton of SO₂ reduced, these ancillary carbon reductions are truly "free" from a social cost perspective.

Abstract:

Who will pay for new policies to reduce carbon dioxide and other greenhouse gas emissions in the United States? This paper considers a slice of the question by examining the near-term impact on domestic manufacturing industries of both upstream (economy-wide) and downstream (electric power industry only) carbon mitigation policies.

Detailed Census data on the electricity use of four-digit manufacturing industries is combined with input-output information on interindustry purchases to paint a detailed picture of carbon use, including effects on final demand. This approach, which freezes capital and other inputs at current levels and assumes that all costs are passed forward, yields upper-bound estimates of total costs. The results are best viewed as descriptive of the relative burdens within the manufacturing sector rather than as a measure of absolute costs. Overall, the principal conclusion is that within the manufacturing sector (which by definition excludes coal production and electricity generation), only a small number of industries would bear a disproportionate short-term burden of a carbon tax or similar policy. Not surprisingly, an electricity-only policy affects very different manufacturing industries than an economy-wide carbon tax.

Abstract: Accurate estimates of pollution abatement costs are crucial elements of any rational effort to set or evaluate environmental policies. One of the primary sources of this information in the United States has been the Bureau of the Census (BOC) Pollution Abatement Costs and Expenditures (PACE) survey, which collected annual establishment-level data on abatement costs for most years between 1972 and 1994. After a five-year lapse, the PACE survey was restarted in 2000, collecting 1999 data. Yet as firms have turned to more comprehensive abatement strategies involving process and design changes, pollution prevention, and recycling, the PACE survey has faced a number of problems that limit its ability to accurately measure abatement costs. At the same time, both national and international interest in understanding the true costs of environmental protection has grown, along with the complexity of the research and policy issues currently under discussion. There is now widespread interest in redesigning the PACE survey to improve its usefulness to policymakers as well as to researchers. In March 2000, Resources for the Future (RFF) convened an expert workshop to consider a wide range of issues relevant to future PACE surveys. This report describes the workshop and derives a number of conclusions based on discussions at the workshop.

Abstract:

Expenditures for environmental protection in the U.S. are estimated to exceed $150 billion annually or about 2% of GDP. This estimate, based on largely self-reported information, is often cited as an assessment of the burden of current regulatory efforts and a standard against which the associated benefits are measured. Little is known, however, about how well reported expenditures relate to true costs. The potential for both incidental savings and uncounted burdens means that actual costs could be either higher or lower than reported expenditures.

A significant literature supports the notion that increases in reported environmental expenditures probably understate actual economic costs. Estimates of the true cost of a dollar increase in reported environmental spending range from $1.50 to $12.

This paper explores the relationship between reported expenditures and economic cost in the manufacturing sector in the context of a large plant-level data set at the four-digit SIC level. We use a cost function modeling approach which treats both environmental and non-environmental production activities as distinct, unrelated cost minimization problems for each plant. We then explore the possibility that these activities are, in fact, related by including reported regulatory expenditures in the cost function for non-environmental output. Under the null hypothesis that reported regulatory expenditures accurately measure the cost of regulation, the coefficient on this term should be zero.

In ten of eleven industries studied, including all of the heavily regulated industries, this null hypothesis is accepted using our preferred fixed-effects model. Our best estimate, based on an expenditure weighted average of the four most heavily regulated industries, indicates that an incremental dollar of reported environmental expenditure reduces non-environmental production costs by eighteen cents with a standard error of forty-two cents. This is equivalent to saying that total costs rise by eighty-two cents for every dollar increase in reported environmental expenditures. Using an alternative pooled model we find uniformly higher estimates. Although consistent with previous results, we believe these higher estimates are biased by omitted variables characterizing differences among plants.

Summarizing, our results enable us to reject claims that environmental spending imposes large hidden costs on manufacturing plants. In fact, our best estimate indicates a modest though statistically insignificant overstatement of regulatory costs.

Abstract:

The possibility that workers could be adversely affected by environmental policies imposed on heavily regulated industries has led to claims of a "jobs versus the environment" trade-off by both business and labor leaders. The present research examines this claim at the industry level for four heavily polluting industries: pulp and paper mills, plastic manufacturers, petroleum refiners, and iron and steel mills. By focusing on labor effects across an entire industry, we construct a measure relevant to the concerns of key stakeholders, such as labor unions and trade groups.

We decompose the link between environmental regulation and employment into three distinct components: factor shifts to more or less labor intensity, changes in total expenditures, and changes in the quantity of output demanded. We use detailed plant-level data to estimate the key parameters describing factor shifts and changes in total expenditures. We then use aggregate time-series data on industry supply shocks and output responses to estimate the demand effect.

We find that increased environmental spending generally does not cause a significant change in industry-level employment. Our average across all four industries is a net gain of 1.5 jobs per $1 million in additional environmental spending, with a standard error of 2.2 jobs—an insignificant effect. In the plastics and petroleum sectors, however, there are small but significantly positive effects: 6.9 and 2.2 jobs, respectively, per $1 million in additional expenditures. These effects can be linked to favorable factor shifts—environmental spending is more labor intensive than ordinary production—and relatively inelastic estimated demand.

Abstract:

This study compares ex ante estimates of the direct costs of individual regulations to ex post assessments of the same regulations. A review of more than two dozen environmental and occupational safety regulations indicates that ex ante estimates of total (direct) costs have tended to exceed actuals. The authors find this to be true of 12 of the 25 rules in their data set, while for only 6 were the ex ante estimates too low. The overestimation of total costs is often due to errors in the quantity of emission reductions achieved by the rule which, in turn, suggest that the rule's benefits may also be overestimated. The quantity errors are driven by both baseline and compliance issues. At least for EPA and OSHA rules, overestimation of per-unit abatement costs occurs about as often as underestimation. In contrast, for those rules that use economic incentives, per-unit costs are consistently overestimated.

Much of the overestimation can be attributed to technical innovations unanticipated at the time the rule is issued, and to quantity errors. In addition, several methodological and procedural explanations also apply: changes in the regulation after the cost estimate is prepared, use of maximum cost estimates, and asymmetric error correction.

Since a number of environmental laws encourage the development of cost estimates that reflect a maximum rather than a mean, regulatory agencies could issue a "best estimate" along with the statutorily preferred cost estimate. Likewise, they could ensure that rule changes made in the course of the regulatory development process are manifest in revised cost estimates. Indeed, discovering how and when to adjust ex ante estimates provides the strongest possible justification for more credible ex post studies—a research activity that merits greater emphasis.

Abstract: This paper focuses on the economic desirability of the fixed and relatively short-term greenhouse gas targets and timetables in the Kyoto Protocol. The Protocol provides flexibility in which greenhouse gases to control, where control can be implemented, and what domestic policy measures are used. However, the Protocol does not allow much flexibility in when emission reductions take place in pursuit of longer-term environmental goals. Nor does it allow more flexible shorter-term environmental targets through price-based policy instruments that balance environmental goals and compliance costs. The relative inflexibility of the Protocol with respect to these elements may derive, in part, from a misplaced analogy between the global warming issue and the highly successful effort to phase out CFCs under the Montreal Protocol. The lack of "when" flexibility may be a key barrier to achieving the broader goals of the Kyoto Protocol, particularly if "where" flexibility is constrained in implementing the Protocol.

Abstract:

Reported expenditures for environmental protection in the U.S. are estimated to exceed $150 billion annually or about 2% of GDP. This estimate is often used as an assessment of the burden of current regulatory efforts and a standard against which the associated benefits are measured. This makes it a key statistic in the debate surrounding both current and future environmental regulation. Little is known, however, about how well reported expenditures relate to true economic cost. True economic cost depends on whether reported environmental expenditures generate incidental savings, involve uncounted burdens, or accurately reflect the total cost of environmental protection.

This paper explores the relationship between reported expenditures and economic costs in a number of major manufacturing industries. Previous research has suggested that an incremental $1 of reported environmental expenditures increases total production costs by anywhere from $1 to $12, i.e. increases in reported costs probably understate the actual increase in economic cost. Surprisingly, our results suggest the reverse, that increases in reported costs may overstate the actual increase in economic cost.

Our results are based on a large plant-level data set for eleven four-digit SIC industries. We employ a cost-function modeling approach that involves three basic steps. First, we treat real environmental expenditures as a second output of the plant, reflecting perceived environmental abatement efforts. Second, we model the joint production of conventional output and environmental effort as a cost-minimization problem. Third, we calculate the effect of an incremental dollar of reported environmental expenditures at the plant, industry, and manufacturing sector levels. Our approach differs from previous work with similar data by considering a large number of industries, using a cost-function modeling approach, and paying particular attention to plant-specific effects.

Our preferred, fixed-effects model obtains an aggregate estimate of thirteen cents in increased costs for every dollar of reported incremental pollution control expenditures, with a standard error of sixty-one cents. This single estimate, however, conceals the wide range of values observed at the industry and plant level. We also find that estimates using an alternative, random-effects model are uniformly higher. Although the higher, random-effects estimates are more consistent with previous work, we believe they are biased by omitted variables characterizing differences among plants.

While further research is needed, our results suggest that previous estimates of the economic cost associated with environmental expenditures have been biased upward and that the possibility of overstatement is quite real.

Abstract: Significant environmental benefits are often associated with the rapid diffusion of new energy-saving technologies. Over the past decade, the federal government, as well as electric and gas utilities, have begun to provide free technical information to potential buyers to stimulate private investment in certain technologies, particularly for retrofitting existing buildings. Yet it has not been demonstrated that this provision of technical information can truly accelerate the rate of technology diffusion. This study develops a model of firm behavior that incorporates multiple factors in the decision to retrofit high efficiency lighting technologies. Technology retrofit and the acceptance of technical information are modeled as jointly determined dichotomous variables, and their determinants are estimated using a bivariate probit specification. The principal conclusion is that information programs make a significant contribution to the diffusion of high efficiency lighting in commercial office buildings, although these programs are less important than basic price signals.

Abstract: Both theory and recent trends suggest some optimism for the future of environment-related taxes. While new research emphasizes the potentially significant distortions created by environmental taxes and appears to undermine the so-called "double dividend" theory, it also suggests that virtually any environmental policy, including regulations, taxes, and tradable permits, can compound existing distortions in the tax system. Currently, direct environmental taxes, such as per-unit charges on emissions, are only in limited use; however, indirect environmental levies, including taxes on fuels, vehicles, beverage containers, and fertilizers, are growing in importance across the OECD nations. Over the period 1990-1993, environmental taxes as a share of total revenue increased while taxes on personal and corporate income declined slightly, indicating a modest tax shift.