Abstract: In September 2011, the US Environmental Protection Agency asked 12 economists how the benefits and costs of regulations should be discounted for projects that affect future generations. This paper summarizes the views of the panel on three topics: the use of the Ramsey formula as an organizing principle for determining discount rates over long horizons, whether the discount rate should decline over time, and how intra- and intergenerational discounting practices can be made compatible.The panel members agree that the Ramsey formula provides a useful framework for thinking about intergenerational discounting. We also agree that theory provides compelling arguments for a declining certainty-equivalent discount rate. In the Ramsey formula, uncertainty about the future rate of growth in per capita consumption can lead to a declining consumption rate of discount, assuming that shocks to consumption are positively correlated. This uncertainty in future consumption growth rates may be estimated econometrically based on historic observations, or it can be derived from subjective uncertainty about the mean rate of growth in mean consumption or its volatility. Determining the remaining parameters of the Ramsey formula is, however, challenging.

Abstract: Carbon markets are substantial and they are expanding. There are many lessons from experiences over the past eight years: fewer free allowances, better management of market-sensitive information, and a recognition that trading systems require adjustments that have consequences for market participants and market confidence. Moreover, the emerging international architecture features separate emissions trading systems serving distinct jurisdictions. These programs are complemented by a variety of other types of policies alongside the carbon markets. This sits in sharp contrast to the integrated global trading architecture envisioned 15 years ago by the designers of the Kyoto Protocol and raises a suite of new questions. In this new architecture, jurisdictions with emissions trading have to decide how, whether, and when to link with one another, and policymakers overseeing carbon markets must confront how to measure the comparability of efforts among markets and relative to a variety of other policy approaches.

Abstract: Because conventional command-and-control environmental regulation often performs poorly in developing countries, policymakers are increasingly experimenting with alternatives, including state-sponsored voluntary regulatory programs that provide incentives, but not mandates, for pollution control. Although the literature on this trend is quite thin, research in industrialized countries suggests that voluntary programs are sometimes ineffective because they mainly attract relatively clean participants seeking to free-ride on unrelated pollution control investments. We use plant-level data on more than 60,000 facilities to identify the drivers of participation in the Clean Industry Program, Mexico’s flagship voluntary regulatory initiative. Our results suggest that the threat of regulatory sanctions drives participation in the program. Therefore, the program does appear to attract relatively dirty firms. We also find that plants that sold their goods in overseas markets and to government suppliers, used imported inputs, were relatively large, and were in certain sectors and states were more likely to participate in the program, all other things equal.

Abstract: This paper provides an exhaustive review of critical issues in the design of climate mitigation policy by pulling together key findings and controversies from diverse literatures on mitigation costs, damage valuation, policy instrument choice, technological innovation, and international climate policy. We begin with the broadest issue of how high assessments suggest the near and medium term price on greenhouse gases would need to be, both under cost-effective stabilization of global climate and under net benefit maximization or Pigouvian emissions pricing. The remainder of the paper focuses on the appropriate scope of regulation, issues in policy instrument choice, complementary technology policy, and international policy architectures.

Abstract: Cost containment has emerged as a major point of contention in the current congressional debate about designing a cap-and-trade program to limit future U.S. greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions. This paper reviews basic concepts and policy options for cost management, drawing on a March 2008 workshop sponsored by Resources for the Future (RFF), the National Commission on Energy Policy, and Duke University’s Nicholas Institute for Environmental Policy Solutions. The different sources and temporal dimensions of cost uncertainty are explored, along with possible mechanisms for addressing short- and long-term cost concerns, including banking and borrowing, emissions offsets, a price cap (or safety valve), quantity-limited allowance reserve, and the concept of an oversight entity for GHG allowance markets modeled on the Federal Reserve. Recognizing that the inherent trade-off between environmental certainty and cost certainty has no perfect solution, the paper nonetheless concludes that numerous options exist for striking a reasonable and politically viable balance between these two objectives. In the effort to forge consensus around a particular set of options, it will be important for policymakers to strive to fit the remedy to the problem they are trying to solve and to preserve the underlying integrity of the overall program in terms of its long-term ability to sustain meaningful market incentives for low-carbon technologies.

Abstract: Despite the growing importance of voluntary programs as tools for environmental management, they have been subject to quite limited evaluation. Program evaluation in the absence of randomized experiments is difficult because the decision to participate may not be random and, in particular, may be correlated with the outcomes. The present study is designed to overcome these problems by gauging the environmental effectiveness of two voluntary climate change programs—the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency’s Climate Wise program and the U.S. Department of Energy’s Voluntary Reporting of Greenhouse Gases Program, or 1605(b)—with particular attention to the participation decision and how various assumptions affect estimates of program outcomes. For both programs, the analysis focuses on manufacturing firms and uses confidential census data to create a comparison group and to measure outcomes (expenditures on fuel and electricity).Overall, we find that that the effects from Climate Wise and 1605(b) on fuel and electricity expenditures are no more than 10 percent and probably less than 5 percent. Virtually no evidence suggests a statistically significant effect of either Climate Wise or 1605(b) on fuel costs. Some evidence suggests that participation in Climate Wise led to a slight (3–5 percent) increase in electricity costs that vanished after two years. Stronger evidence suggests that participation in 1605(b) led to a slight (4–8 percent) decrease in electricity costs that persisted for at least three years.

Abstract: On efficiency grounds, the economics community has to date tended to emphasize price-based policies to address climate change—such as taxes or a “safety-valve” price ceiling for cap-and-trade— while environmental advocates have sought a more clear quantitative limit on emissions. This paper presents a simple modification to the idea of a safety valve: a quantitative limit that we call the allowancereserve. Importantly, this idea may bridge the gap between competing interests and potentially improve efficiency relative to tax or other price-based policies. The last point highlights the deficiencies in several previous studies of price and quantity controls for climate change that do not adequately capture the dynamic opportunities within a cap-and-trade system for allowance banking, borrowing, and intertemporal arbitrage in response to unfolding information.

Abstract: Welfare comparisons of regulatory instruments under uncertainty, even in dynamic analyses, have typically focused on price versus quantity controls despite the presence of banking and borrowingprovisions in existing emissions trading programs. This is true even in the presence of banking and borrowing provisions in existing emissions trading programs. Nonetheless, many have argued that suchprovisions can reduce price volatility and lower costs in the face of uncertainty, despite any theoretical or empirical evidence. This paper develops a model and solves for optimal banking and borrowing behavior with uncertain cost shocks that are serially correlated. We show that while banking does reduce price volatility and lowers costs, the degree of these reductions depends on the persistence of shocks. For plausible parameter values related to U.S. climate change policy, we find that bankable quantities eliminate about 20 percent of the cost difference between price and nonbankable quantities.

Abstract: Over the coming decades, the cost of U.S. climate change policy likely will be comparable to the total cost of all existing environmental regulation—perhaps 1–2 percent of national income. In order to avoid higher costs, policy efforts should create incentives for firms and individuals to pursue the cheapest climate change mitigation options over time, among all sectors, across national borders, and in the face of significant uncertainty. Well-designed national greenhouse gas mitigation policies can serve as the foundation for global efforts and as an example for emerging and developing countries. We present six key policy design issues that will determine the costs, cost-effectiveness, and distributional impacts of domestic climate policy: program scope, cost containment, offsets, revenues and allowance allocation, competitiveness, and R&D policy. We synthesize the literature on these design features, review the implications for the ongoing policy debate, and identify outstanding research questions that can inform policy development.

Abstract: The approach used to model technological change in a climate policy model is a critical determinant of its results. We provide an overview of the different approaches used in the literature, with an emphasis on recent developments regarding endogenous technological change, research and development, and learning. Detailed examination sheds light on the salient features of each approach, including strengths, limitations, and policy implications. Key issues include proper accounting for the opportunity costs of climate-related knowledge generation, treatment of knowledge spillovers and appropriability, and the empirical basis for parameterizing technological relationships. No single approach appears to dominate on all these dimensions, and different approaches may be preferred depending on the purpose of the analysis, be it positive or normative.

Abstract: Technologies to reduce significantly fossil-fuel emissions currently are unavailable or only available at high cost. In light of this, the amount of research on the pace, direction, and benefits of environmentally friendly technological change has grown dramatically in recent years. This research includes empirical estimates of these effects and modeling exercises designed to simulate endogenous technological change in response to climate policy. Unfortunately, few attempts have been made to connect these two streams of research. This paper attempts to bridge that gap, reviewing both the empirical and modeling literature on technological change.Our goal is to provide an agenda for how both empirical and modeling research in these areas can move forward in a complementary fashion. In doing so, we discuss how models used for policy evaluation can better capture empirical phenomena and how empirical research can better address the needs of models used for policy evaluation.

Abstract: Momentum may be building for federal climate change policy in the United States. Assuming this leads to mandatory greenhouse gas regulations, the door will be open for the United States to constructively re-engage other countries concerning an international climate regime. Such a regime will need to recognize that binding international limits are unlikely to attract U.S. participation and, therefore, will require a different approach than the Kyoto Protocol. In particular, a future regime will need to accommodate and encourage, rather than force or constrain, domestic actions to focus more narrowly on major economies and emitting nations, to balance mitigation and technology objectives, and to engage developing countries on as many levels as possible. In place of a heavy emphasis on negotiating commitments in advance, there likely will need to be greater emphasis on evaluating actions in retrospect. Such an approach not only matches recent trends in the United States but arguably follows from broader experience over the decade since the negotiation of the Kyoto Protocol.

Abstract: In 2005, the European Union introduced the largest and most ambitious emissions trading program in the world to meet its Kyoto commitments for the containment of global climate change. The EU Emissions Trading Scheme (EU ETS) has some distinctive features that differentiate it from the more standard model of emissions trading. In particular, it has a relatively decentralized structure that gives individual member states responsibility for setting targets, allocating permits, determining verification and enforcement, and making some choices about flexibility. It is also a “cap-within-a-cap,” seeking to achieve the Kyoto targets while only covering about half of EU emissions. Finally, it is a program that many hope will link with other greenhouse gas trading programs in the future—something we have not seen among existing trading systems. Examining these features coupled with recent EU ETS experience offers lessons about how cost effectiveness, equity, flexibility, and compliance fare in a multi-jurisdictional trading program, and highlights the challenges facing a global emissions trading regime.

Abstract: This paper argues that while a long-term solution to climate change may require the global market-based solution envisioned in the Kyoto Protocol, a more flexible near-term approach is necessary. First, a broad range of domestic policies need to be embraced and encouraged by an international agreement, not constrained or discouraged by it. Second, developing countries need to be an increased focus of engagement, with expansion and reform of project-based crediting. Finally, a global agreement needs to recognize both technology and mitigation policies and to develop ways to evaluate efforts along each of these dimensions. Over the longer term, such an agreement should evolve toward greater reliance on global market-based solutions, and therefore near-term steps should be viewed both in terms of their immediate practicality and their potential to be refined over time.

Abstract: Global climate change poses a threat to the well-being of humans and other living things through impacts on ecosystem functioning, biodiversity, capital productivity, and human health. Climate change economics attends to this issue by offering theoretical insights and empirical findings relevant to the design of policies to reduce, avoid, or adapt to climate change. This economic analysis has yielded new estimates of mitigation benefits, improved understanding of costs in the presence of various market distortions or imperfections, better tools for making policy choices under uncertainty, and alternate mechanisms for allowing flexibility in policy responses. These contributions have influenced the formulation and implementation of a range of climate change policies at the domestic and international levels.

Abstract: This paper argues against the common-sense conclusion that climate change demands a global market-based solution, such as international emissions trading. First, current experience suggests global cooperation is not necessary for initial mandatory actions. Second, when domestic targets vary across nations, there are a variety of reasons why international emissions trading, even though it creates aggregate economic gains for all nations, may not be desirable. These reasons include concerns over legitimizing target variations for future negotiations, real and perceived consequences of capital flows across nations, and distributional impacts within nations. Finally, the underlying need for global technology solutions suggests domestic mitigation policies that balance clear emissions price signals, incentives for technology development and deployment, and mechanisms to finance deployment to developing countries. International efforts, in turn, might focus on encouraging these domestic actions, facilitating the developing country investment mechanisms, and providing credible reviews of national action.

Abstract: Seminal work by Weitzman (1974) revealed that prices are preferred to quantities when marginal benefits are relatively flat compared to marginal costs. We extend this comparison to indexed policies, where quantities are proportional to an index, such as output. We find that policy preferences hinge on additional parameters describing the first and second moments of the index and the ex post optimal quantity level. When the ratio of these variables’ coefficients of variation divided by their correlation is less than two, indexed quantities are preferred to fixed quantities. A slightly more complex condition determines when indexed quantities are preferred to prices. Applied to the case of climate change, we find that quantities indexed to GDP are preferred to fixed quantities for about half of the 19 largest emitters, including the United States and China, while (consistent with previous work) prices dominate for all countries.

Abstract: The uncertainty surrounding both costs and benefits associated with global climate change mitigation creates enormous hurdles for scientists, stakeholders, and decisionmakers. A key issue is how policy choices balance uncertainty about costs and benefits. This balance arises in terms of the time path of mitigation efforts as well as whether those efforts, by design, focus on effort or outcome. This paper considers two choices—price versus quantity controls and absolute versus relative/intensity emissions limits—demonstrating that price controls and intensity emissions limits favor certainty about cost over climate benefits and future emissions reductions. The paper then argues that in the near term, this favoritism is desired.

Abstract: Resources for the Future and the Institute for Global Environmental Strategies convened a oneand one-half day workshop on domestic and international climate policy May 11–12, 2005, in Tokyo,Japan. The first day included 49 participants hearing presentations from 13 speakers and discussingdomestic activities, economics, and politics. The second day included a smaller group of participantslistening to a panel of four experts and discussing opportunities for future international climate regimes.Participants included government officials from the Japanese Ministry of the Environment; the JapaneseMinistry of Economy, Trade and Industry; the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency; the U.S.Department of State; and the Massachussetts Department of Commonwealth Development;representatives from business and environmental groups; and academic experts. Over the course of bothdays, it was clear that great opportunities exist for regularly informing experts from both countries onrecent policy developments, economic analyses, and political nuances in the other country. For example,U.S. participants had an opportunity to learn the process through which Japanese technology standardsare set and implemented, the subtle evolution of mandatory policy discussions, and details of currentpolicies on voluntary trading and an emission registry. Japanese participants benefited from a frankdiscussion with U.S. experts of how and why it would be difficult to link different domestic emissionstrading markets, the current process to establish a regional emissions trading program, and the evolvingdynamics in the U.S. Senate.Looking forward, important lessons may be taken from past negotiating experiences. A smallgroup of national leaders, including large emitters of greenhouse gases and major economies, addressingnot only climate change but also developmental issues, could be a useful vehicle for meaningfulinternational efforts. Such a small-group process should be carried out in parallel with the multilateralUnited Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change process. In addition, policies in both theUnited States and Japan reflect a strong emphasis on technology development and commercialization; thismay be an area where bilateral cooperation could be particularly beneficial.

Abstract: We estimate a carbon mitigation cost curve for the U.S. commercial sector based on econometric estimation of the responsiveness of fuel demand and equipment choices to energy price changes. The model econometrically estimates fuel demand conditional on fuel choice, which is characterized by a multinomial logit model. Separate estimation of end uses (e.g., heating, cooking) using the 1995 Commercial Buildings Energy Consumption Survey allows for exceptionally detailed estimation of price responsiveness disaggregated by end use and fuel type. We then construct aggregate long-run elasticities, by fuel type, through a series of simulations; own-price elasticities range from –0.9 for district heat services to –2.9 for fuel oil. The simulations form the basis of a marginal cost curve for carbon mitigation, which suggests that a price of $20 per ton of carbon would result in an 8% reduction in commercial carbon emissions, and a price of $100 per ton would result in a 28% reduction.

Abstract: Economic analyses of climate change policies frequently focus on reductions of energy-related carbondioxide emissions via market-based, economywide policies. The current course of environment andenergy policy debate in the United States, however, suggests an alternative outcome: inefficientlydesigned and/or sector-based policies. This paper uses a collection of specialized, sector-based models inconjunction with a computable general equilibrium model of the economy to examine and compare thesepolicies at an aggregate level. We examine the relative cost of different policies designed to achieve thesame quantity of emissions reductions. We find that excluding a limited number of sectors from aneconomywide policy does not significantly raise costs. Focusing policy solely on the electricity andtransportation sectors doubles costs, however, and using nonmarket policies can raise costs by a factor of10. These results are driven in part by, and are sensitive to, our modeling of preexisting tax distortions.

Abstract: While the rest of the world has pursued absolute emissions limits for greenhouse gases, the Bush administration has proposed an alternative policy formulation based, among other things, on reducing emissions intensity—that is, emissions per dollar of real gross domestic product. Critics of this formulation have denounced the general idea of an intensity-based emissions target, along with its voluntary nature and weak targets. This raises the question of whether intensity-based emissions limits, distinct from the other features of the Bush initiative, offer a useful alternative to absolute emissionslimits. This paper makes the case that they do, based on how emissions targets are framed. The argument draws on four key observations: greenhouse gas emissions will continue to rise over the near term, absolute targets emphasize zero or declining emissions growth while intensity targets do not, developing countries’ economic development is integrally tied to emissions growth for the foreseeable future, and intensity targets need not be any more complicated to administer than absolute targets.

Abstract: The European Union is on the verge of establishing an emissions trading program ten times the size of the Acid Rain trading program in the United States. Its design takes advantage of many lessons from existing experience with trading programs, as well as economic theory, and innovates in important ways. While we view this as an impressive development, concerns about equity, enforcement, and efficiency remain. Specifically, a lack of data and weaker environmental institutions in some EU Member States raises questions about both allowance allocations and compliance and enforcement. Although much attention has focused on whether prices will be “too low” in the first phase of the program, a greater risk is that uncertainty about program elements, technology and behavioral response, and external events could create volatile markets and costly compliance in the second phase. Regardless of outcome, the EU trading system will be influential in future international efforts to reduce greenhouse gases.

Abstract: Resources for the Future and the Institute for Global Environmental Strategies (Japan) conveneda one-and-one-half day workshop on domestic and international climate policy on February 12–13, 2004in Washington, D.C. On the first day, 55 participants heard presentations from 14 speakers and discusseddomestic activities, economics, and politics. The second day featured a smaller group of 27 participantshearing six informal sets of comments and discussing opportunities for international collaboration.Participants included government officials from the Japanese Ministry of the Environment, the U.S.Environmental Protection Agency, and other U.S. administration and congressional staff; representativesfrom business and environmental groups; and academic experts. Over the course of both days, it was clearthat great opportunities exist for informing participants from both countries on recent developments,economic analyses, and political nuances in the other country. For example, American participants wereunaware of the Keidanren’s success at exceeding required efficiency standards. Japanese participantswere unaware of U.S. treaty tradition, by which ratification cannot occur until implementing legislation isin place—a fact that makes the Kyoto Protocol virtually unratifiable. Participants on both sides benefitedfrom a frank discussion of how and why it may be unwise for the international community to attempt tore-engage the United States in international climate policy until the United States settles on its own courseof meaningful domestic action.

Looking forward, an important lesson may be taken from U.S. experience with earlyenvironmental regulation, where state action provided experience and impetus for federal action. As analternative to the Kyoto model, distinct national actions may provide experience and impetus forinternational action. In addition, policies in both the United States and Japan reflect a strong emphasis ontechnology development and commercialization; this may be an area where bilateral cooperation could beparticularly beneficial.

Abstract: In this study we use datasets from the 1995 and 2000 Community Water Supply surveys to examine the production costs of water supply systems. We first estimate the economies of scale in water supply by estimating the total unit cost as well as individual component cost elasticities. For total unit cost elasticity, we find that a 1% increase in production reduces unit costs by a statistically significant 0.16%. For individual component cost elasticities, we find that higher economies of scale exist in capital costs, outside costs, other costs, and materials costs; labor costs and energy costs exhibit lower but still positive economies of scale. These economies of scale may reflect production economies or suggest that larger systems are better than smaller systems at bargaining and can obtain inputs at a lower unit cost. Importantly, bargaining gains and some production economies do not necessarily depend on water systems’ becoming physically interconnected.

Abstract: The political economy of environmental policy favors the use of quantity-based instruments over price-based instruments (e.g., tradable permits over green taxes), at least in the United States. With cost uncertainty, however, there are clear efficiency advantages to prices in many cases, especially for stock pollutants such as greenhouse gases. The question arises, therefore, of whether one can design flexible quantity policies that mimic the behavior of price policies, namely stable permit prices and abatement costs. We explore a number of “quantity-plus” policies that replicate the behavior of a price policy through rules that adjust the effective permit cap for unexpectedly low or high costs. They do so without necessitating any monetary exchanges between the government and the regulated firms, which can be a significant political barrier to the use of price instruments.

Abstract: Most studies that compare price and quantity controls for greenhouse gas emissions under uncertainty find that price mechanisms perform substantially better. In these studies, the benefits from reducing emissions are proportional to the level of reductions, and such linear benefits strongly favor price policies (Weitzman 1974). Catastrophic damages, however, challenge that intuition as consequences become highly nonlinear. Catastrophe avoidance offers huge benefits, and incremental adjustments on either side of the associated threshold are relatively unimportant, suggesting a strong preference for quantity controls.This paper shows that with catastrophic damages, both price and quantity mechanisms offer large gains over the business-as-usual alternative, and the difference between policies is never more than 10%. Catastrophe avoidance is much more important than efficient catastrophe avoidance. Although previous studies favoring price policies in the presence of uncertainty have worried that catastrophes would reverse their results, this analysis indicates that such concerns are not borne out.

Abstract: Decisions concerning environmental protection hinge on estimates of economic burden. Over the past 30 years, economists have developed and applied various tools to measure this burden. In this paper, developed as a chapter for the Handbook of Environmental Economics, we present a taxonomy of costs along with methods for measuring those costs. At the broadest level, we distinguish between partial and general equilibrium costs. Partial equilibrium costs represent the burden directly borne by the regulated entity (firms, households, government), including both pecuniary and nonpecuniary expenses, when prices are held constant. General equilibrium costs reflect the net burden once all good and factor markets have equilibrated. In addition to partial equilibrium costs, these general equilibrium costs include welfare losses or gains in markets with preexisting distortions, welfare losses or gains from rebalancing the government's budget constraint, and welfare gains from the added flexibility of meeting pollution constraints through reductions in the use of higher-priced, pollution-intensive products. In addition to both partial and general equilibrium costs, we also consider the distribution of costs across households, countries, sectors, subnational regions, and generations. Despite improvements in our understanding of cost measurement, we find considerable opportunity for further work and, especially, better application of existing methods.

Abstract: Improved technology is often cited as a means to alter the otherwise difficult trade-off between the economic burden of regulation and environmental damage. Focusing on energy-saving technologies that mitigate the threat of climate change, we find that both energy prices and financial health influence technology adoption among a sample of industrial plants in four heavily polluting sectors. Based on a model linking technology adoption to growth in aggregate efficiency, we estimate that a doubling of energy prices, after raising the growth rate to 2.1%, would require slightly more than 50 years to generate a 50% improvement in aggregate efficiency relative to the baseline forecast.

Abstract: This paper examines whether the welfare gains from technological innovation that reduces future abatement costs are larger or smaller than the “Pigouvian” welfare gains from optimal pollution control. The relative welfare gains from innovation depend on three key factors - the initially optimal level of abatement, the speed at which innovation reduces future abatement costs, and the discount rate. We calculate the welfare gains from innovation under a variety of different scenarios. Mostly they are less than the Pigouvian welfare gains. To be greater, innovation must reduce abatement costs substantially and quickly and the initially optimal abatement level must be fairly modest.

Abstract: This paper examines whether the welfare gains from technological innovation that reduces future abatement costs are larger or smaller than the “Pigouvian” welfare gains from optimal pollution control. The relative welfare gains from innovation depend on three key factors: the initially optimal level of abatement, the speed at which innovation reduces future abatement costs, and the discount rate. We calculate the welfare gains from innovation under a variety of different scenarios. Mostly they are less than the Pigouvian welfare gains. To be greater, innovation must reduce abatement costs substantially and quickly and the initially optimal abatement level must be fairly modest.

Abstract: Accurate estimates of pollution abatement costs are crucial elements of any rational effort to set or evaluate environmental policies. One of the primary sources of this information in the United States has been the Bureau of the Census (BOC) Pollution Abatement Costs and Expenditures (PACE) survey, which collected annual establishment-level data on abatement costs for most years between 1972 and 1994. After a five-year lapse, the PACE survey was restarted in 2000, collecting 1999 data. Yet as firms have turned to more comprehensive abatement strategies involving process and design changes, pollution prevention, and recycling, the PACE survey has faced a number of problems that limit its ability to accurately measure abatement costs. At the same time, both national and international interest in understanding the true costs of environmental protection has grown, along with the complexity of the research and policy issues currently under discussion. There is now widespread interest in redesigning the PACE survey to improve its usefulness to policymakers as well as to researchers. In March 2000, Resources for the Future (RFF) convened an expert workshop to consider a wide range of issues relevant to future PACE surveys. This report describes the workshop and derives a number of conclusions based on discussions at the workshop.

Abstract:

Costs and benefits in the distant future—such as those associated with global warming, long-lived infrastructure, hazardous and radioactive waste, and biodiversity—often have little value today when measured with conventional discount rates. We demonstrate that when the future path of this conventional rate is uncertain and persistent (i.e., highly correlated over time), the distant future should be discounted at lower rates than suggested by the current rate. We then use two centuries of data on U.S. interest rates to quantify this effect. Using both random walk and mean-reverting models (which are indistinguishable based on historical data), we compute the certainty-equivalent rate—that is, the single discount rate that summarizes the effect of uncertainty and measures the appropriate forward rate of discount in the future.

Using the random walk model, which we consider more compelling, we find that the certainty-equivalent rate falls from 3% now to 2% after 100 years, to 1% after 200 years, and down to 0.5% after 300 years. The mean-reverting model leads to a certainty-equivalent rate that remains above 3% for the next 200 years, then falls to 2% after 300 years and to 1% after 400 years. If we use these rates to value consequences at horizons of 400 years, the discounted value increases by a factor of 7,000 based on the random walk model and by a factor of 30 based on the mean-reverting model — both relative to conventional discounting.

These results are relevant for a wide range of policy questions involving the distant future. Applying the random walk model to the consequences of climate change, for example, we find that inclusion of discount rate uncertainty doubles the expected present value of mitigation benefits. Other applications and alternative beliefs about the random walk–mean-reverting distinction are easily explored with our table of discount factors over time.

Abstract:

The otherwise straightforward analysis of randomized experiments is often complicated by the presence of missing data. In such situations it is necessary to make assumptions about the dependence of the selection mechanism on treatment, response, and covariates. The widely used approach of assuming that the data is missing at random conditional on treatment and other fully observed covariates is shown to be inadequate to describe data from a randomized experiment when partially observed covariates are also present.

This paper presents an alternative to the missing at random model (MAR) which is both consistent with the data and preserves the appeal of MAR. In particular, the proposed family of models minimize the discrepancy with MAR while explaining observed deviations. We apply this approach to data from the Restart job training program in the United Kingdom as well as an artificial data set. Evaluation of the Restart program is not affected by the assumption of MAR; both approaches suggest that the program increased the chances of exiting unemployment by around 9% within six months. However, analysis of the artificial data demonstrates that assuming MAR can easily lead to erroneous conclusions.

Abstract:

Economists have speculated that the welfare gains from technological innovation that reduces the future costs of environmental protection could be a lot more important than the "Pigouvian" welfare gains over time from correcting a pollution externality. If so, then a primary concern in the design of environmental policies should be the impact on induced innovation, and a potentially strong case could be made for additional instruments such as research subsidies.

This paper examines the magnitude of the welfare gains from innovation relative to the discounted Pigouvian welfare gains, using a dynamic social planning model in which research and development (R&D) augments a knowledge stock that reduces future pollution abatement costs.

We find that the discounted welfare gains from innovation are typically smaller....and perhaps much smaller....than the discounted Pigouvian welfare gains. This is because the long-run gain to innovation is bounded by the maximum reduction in abatement costs and, since R&D is costly, it takes time to accumulate enough knowledge to substantially reduce abatement costs. Only in cases when innovation substantially reduces abatement costs quickly (by roughly 50% within 10 years) and the Pigouvian amount of abatement is initially modest, can the welfare gains from innovation exceed the welfare gains from pollution control. These results apply for both flow and stock pollutants, and for linear and convex environmental damage functions.

Our results suggest that spurring technological innovation should not be emphasized at the expense of achieving the optimal amount of pollution control. More generally, our results appear to have implications for a broad range of policy issues. They suggest that the welfare gains from innovation that reduces the costs of supplying any public good (defense, crime prevention, infrastructure, etc.) may be fairly small relative to those from providing the optimal amount of the public good over time.

Abstract:

Expenditures for environmental protection in the U.S. are estimated to exceed $150 billion annually or about 2% of GDP. This estimate, based on largely self-reported information, is often cited as an assessment of the burden of current regulatory efforts and a standard against which the associated benefits are measured. Little is known, however, about how well reported expenditures relate to true costs. The potential for both incidental savings and uncounted burdens means that actual costs could be either higher or lower than reported expenditures.

A significant literature supports the notion that increases in reported environmental expenditures probably understate actual economic costs. Estimates of the true cost of a dollar increase in reported environmental spending range from $1.50 to $12.

This paper explores the relationship between reported expenditures and economic cost in the manufacturing sector in the context of a large plant-level data set at the four-digit SIC level. We use a cost function modeling approach which treats both environmental and non-environmental production activities as distinct, unrelated cost minimization problems for each plant. We then explore the possibility that these activities are, in fact, related by including reported regulatory expenditures in the cost function for non-environmental output. Under the null hypothesis that reported regulatory expenditures accurately measure the cost of regulation, the coefficient on this term should be zero.

In ten of eleven industries studied, including all of the heavily regulated industries, this null hypothesis is accepted using our preferred fixed-effects model. Our best estimate, based on an expenditure weighted average of the four most heavily regulated industries, indicates that an incremental dollar of reported environmental expenditure reduces non-environmental production costs by eighteen cents with a standard error of forty-two cents. This is equivalent to saying that total costs rise by eighty-two cents for every dollar increase in reported environmental expenditures. Using an alternative pooled model we find uniformly higher estimates. Although consistent with previous results, we believe these higher estimates are biased by omitted variables characterizing differences among plants.

Summarizing, our results enable us to reject claims that environmental spending imposes large hidden costs on manufacturing plants. In fact, our best estimate indicates a modest though statistically insignificant overstatement of regulatory costs.

Abstract:

The possibility that workers could be adversely affected by environmental policies imposed on heavily regulated industries has led to claims of a "jobs versus the environment" trade-off by both business and labor leaders. The present research examines this claim at the industry level for four heavily polluting industries: pulp and paper mills, plastic manufacturers, petroleum refiners, and iron and steel mills. By focusing on labor effects across an entire industry, we construct a measure relevant to the concerns of key stakeholders, such as labor unions and trade groups.

We decompose the link between environmental regulation and employment into three distinct components: factor shifts to more or less labor intensity, changes in total expenditures, and changes in the quantity of output demanded. We use detailed plant-level data to estimate the key parameters describing factor shifts and changes in total expenditures. We then use aggregate time-series data on industry supply shocks and output responses to estimate the demand effect.

We find that increased environmental spending generally does not cause a significant change in industry-level employment. Our average across all four industries is a net gain of 1.5 jobs per $1 million in additional environmental spending, with a standard error of 2.2 jobs—an insignificant effect. In the plastics and petroleum sectors, however, there are small but significantly positive effects: 6.9 and 2.2 jobs, respectively, per $1 million in additional expenditures. These effects can be linked to favorable factor shifts—environmental spending is more labor intensive than ordinary production—and relatively inelastic estimated demand.

Abstract:

This paper presents an analytical and numerical comparison of the welfare impacts of alternative instruments for environmental protection in the presence of endogenous technological innovation. We analyze emissions taxes and both auctioned and free (grandfathered) emissions permits.

We find that under different sets of circumstances each of the three policies may induce a significantly higher welfare gain than the other two policies. In particular, the relative ranking of policy instruments can crucially depend on the ability of adopting firms to imitate the innovation, the costs of innovation, the slope and level of the marginal environmental benefit function, and the number of firms producing emissions. Moreover, although in theory the welfare impacts of policies differ in the presence of innovation, sometimes these differences are relatively small. In fact, when firms anticipate that policies will be adjusted over time in response to innovation, certain policies can become equivalent.

Our analysis is simplified in a number of respects; for example, we assume homogeneous and competitive firms. Nonetheless, our preliminary results suggest there is no clear-cut case for preferring any one policy instrument on the grounds of dynamic efficiency.

Abstract:

Using a simple analytical model incorporating costs and benefits, stock decay, time discounting, and uncertainty, we uncover several important principles governing the choice of price-based policies (e.g., taxes) relative to quantity-based policies (e.g., tradeable permits) for controlling stock externalities. As in Weitzman (1974), the relative slopes of the marginal benefits and costs of controlling the externality continue to be critical determinants of the efficiency of prices relative to quantities, with flatter marginal benefits and steeper marginal costs favoring prices. But we can say more. The relative slopes also help determine the optimal control path, with convergence to a steady state proceeding slowly as long as marginal benefits are relatively flat. On this basis we conclude that the conditions typically characterizing long-lived stock externalities—in particular, that the optimal control path involves long-term changes in the stock level—tend to favor price-based policies. While this result holds over a wide range of conditions, it depends on several key variables. Positive correlation of cost shocks across time, in particular, as well as low rates of time discounting and stock decay, will tilt the balance back toward quantity controls.

These results are potentially applicable to a wide range of market failures involving stock externalities. In addition to the obvious application to stock pollutants, one can view species preservation, land-use policy, education, and research as areas where policymakers wish to regulate a stock-like externality. This analysis provides a useful framework for comparing alternative policy instruments for regulating such problems. Regarding climate change, for example, these results suggest that the use of tradeable emission permits rather than emission fees to slow growth in the stock of greenhouse gases is probably inefficient. Optimal policy would involve either tradeable permits that quickly stabilize the stock, or emission fees that gradually slow its growth.

Abstract: Uncertainty about compliance costs causes otherwise equivalent price and quantity controls to behave differently. Price controls — in the form of taxes — fix the marginal cost of compliance and lead to uncertain levels of compliance. Meanwhile quantity controls — in the form of tradable permits or quotas — fix the level of compliance but result in uncertain marginal costs. This fundamental difference in the face of cost uncertainty leads to different welfare outcomes for the two policy instruments. Seminal work by Weitzman (1974) clarified this point and derived theoretical conditions under which one policy is preferred to the other. This paper applies this principal to the issue of worldwide greenhouse gas (GHG) control, using a global integrated climate economy model to simulate the consequences of uncertainty and to compare the efficiency of taxes and permits empirically. The results indicate that an optimal tax policy generates gains which are five times higher than the optimal permit policy — a $337 billion dollar gain versus $69 billion at the global level. This result follows from Weitzman’s original intuition that relatively flat marginal benefits/damages favor taxes, a feature that drops out of standard assumptions about the nature of climate damages. A hybrid policy, suggested by Roberts and Spence (1976), is also explored. Such a policy uses an initial distribution of tradeable permits to set a target emission level, but then allows additional permits to be purchased at a fixed "trigger" price. The optimal hybrid policy leads to welfare benefits only slightly higher than the optimal tax policy. Relative to the tax policy, however, the hybrid preserves the ability to flexibly distribute the rents associated with the right to emit. Perhaps more importantly for policy discussions, a sub-optimal hybrid policy, based on a stringent target and high trigger price (e.g., 1990 emissions and a $100/tC trigger), generates much better welfare outcomes than a straight permit system with the same target. Both of these features suggest that a hybrid policy is a more attractive alternative to either a straight tax or permit system.

Abstract:

Reported expenditures for environmental protection in the U.S. are estimated to exceed $150 billion annually or about 2% of GDP. This estimate is often used as an assessment of the burden of current regulatory efforts and a standard against which the associated benefits are measured. This makes it a key statistic in the debate surrounding both current and future environmental regulation. Little is known, however, about how well reported expenditures relate to true economic cost. True economic cost depends on whether reported environmental expenditures generate incidental savings, involve uncounted burdens, or accurately reflect the total cost of environmental protection.

This paper explores the relationship between reported expenditures and economic costs in a number of major manufacturing industries. Previous research has suggested that an incremental $1 of reported environmental expenditures increases total production costs by anywhere from $1 to $12, i.e. increases in reported costs probably understate the actual increase in economic cost. Surprisingly, our results suggest the reverse, that increases in reported costs may overstate the actual increase in economic cost.

Our results are based on a large plant-level data set for eleven four-digit SIC industries. We employ a cost-function modeling approach that involves three basic steps. First, we treat real environmental expenditures as a second output of the plant, reflecting perceived environmental abatement efforts. Second, we model the joint production of conventional output and environmental effort as a cost-minimization problem. Third, we calculate the effect of an incremental dollar of reported environmental expenditures at the plant, industry, and manufacturing sector levels. Our approach differs from previous work with similar data by considering a large number of industries, using a cost-function modeling approach, and paying particular attention to plant-specific effects.

Our preferred, fixed-effects model obtains an aggregate estimate of thirteen cents in increased costs for every dollar of reported incremental pollution control expenditures, with a standard error of sixty-one cents. This single estimate, however, conceals the wide range of values observed at the industry and plant level. We also find that estimates using an alternative, random-effects model are uniformly higher. Although the higher, random-effects estimates are more consistent with previous work, we believe they are biased by omitted variables characterizing differences among plants.

While further research is needed, our results suggest that previous estimates of the economic cost associated with environmental expenditures have been biased upward and that the possibility of overstatement is quite real.

Abstract:

The relevance of uncertainty in the climate change policy debate is without doubt. Surprisingly, there have been few attempts to examine the direct policy consequences of including uncertainty in an integrated climate-economy framework. This paper presents results concerning optimal policy stringency and instrument choice when economic and climate parameters assume distributions rather than single values. Uncertainty is found to raise the optimal level of emission reductions relative to an optimization based on one set of central parameter estimates. Much of this effect can be related to economic rather than climate uncertainty. Uncertainty also leads to a preference for taxes over quantity controls.

Previous studies of uncertainty in the climate change context have used a small number of states to measure the value of earlier information, learning and adaptation. This paper attempts to refocus attention on the more basic question of whether, in the absence of new information and learning, the inclusion of uncertainty yields significantly different policy conclusions. For policymakers confronting the problem of climate change today, this is the more relevant question.