Past Seminar

Assigning Resources to Budget-Constrained Agents

Apr 5, 2012 Webcast

About the Event

Assigning Resources to Budget-Constrained Agents
RFF Academic Seminar

Presenter
Ian Gale, Professor of Economics, Georgetown University

Abstract
This paper studies different methods of assigning a good to budget-constrained agents. Schemes that assign the good randomly and allow resale may outperform the competitive market in terms of Utilitarian efficiency. The socially optimal mechanism involves random assignment at a discount — an in-kind subsidy — and a cash incentive to discourage low-valuation individuals from claiming the good.

Date
Thursday, April 5, 2012
12:00 - 1:30 p.m.

Lunch will be provided.

Location
7th Floor Conference Room
1616 P St. NW
Washington, D.C. 20036

All seminars will be in the 7th Floor Conference Room at RFF, 1616 P Street NW. Attendance is open, but involves pre-registration no later than two days prior to the event. For questions and to register to an event, please contact Khadija Hill at khill@rff.org (tel. 202-328-5174). Updates to our academic seminars schedule will be posted at www.rff.org/academicseminarseries.