Market-based Emissions Regulation and Industry Dynamics
Event Details
Presenters
Mar Reguant, Assistant Professor of Economics, Stanford University
Abstract
We assess the long-run dynamic implications of market-based regulation of carbon dioxide emissions in the US Portland cement industry. We consider several alternative policy designs, including mechanisms that use production subsidies to partially offset compliance costs and border tax adjustments to penalize emissions associated with foreign imports. Our results highlight two general countervailing market distortions. First, following Buchanan (1969), reductions in product market surplus and allocative inefficiencies due to market power in the domestic cement market counteract the social benefits of carbon abatement. Second, trade exposure to unregulated foreign competitors leads to emissions “leakage” which offsets domestic emissions reductions. Taken together, these forces result in social welfare losses under policy regimes that fully internalize the emissions externality. In contrast, market-based policies that incorporate design features to mitigate the exercise of market power and emissions leakage can deliver welfare gains.
Date
Wednesday, November 14, 2012
12:00 - 1:30 p.m. Lunch will be provided. Location
7th Floor Conference Room
1616 P St. NW
Washington, DC 20036 All seminars will be in the 7th Floor Conference Room at RFF, 1616 P Street NW. Attendance is open, but involves pre-registration no later than two days prior to the event. For questions and to register to an event, please contact Khadija Hill at [email protected] (tel. 202-328-5174). Updates to our academic seminars schedule will be posted at www.rff.org/academicseminarseries.
