Weathervane

Mar15

U.S. Climate Policy and the Shape of International Agreements, Part 4

What’s Next for U.S. and International Climate Policy

The nations of the world came together in Copenhagen this past December to continue a process begun in 1992 at the Rio Summit to address the causes and consequences of climate change. The ultimate goal of that process is to reach an international agreement that will limit global greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions to “safe” levels while at the same time ensuring the nations most vulnerable to the impacts of climate change are provided the financial and technical means to adapt to a changed climate.

As I mentioned in my previous posts (here, here and here), this series will provide a view of Copenhagen from a distinctly American perspective, blending global economics with domestic U.S. politics. The outcome of Copenhagen and the international process that now follows is shaped largely by the domestic politics of all the major emitting countries with U.S. domestic politics playing a particularly large role.

In this post, I’ll take a look at where international negotiations are likely to go after Copenhagen and what role the U.S. will play on the international stage going forward.

International Negotiations Post Copenhagen

One can argue that Copenhagen marked a substantial shift in the dynamics of global climate policy development. A good deal of that shift is due to the renewed presence of the U.S. in international negotiations. Copenhagen moved the development of global policy further away from a Kyoto-like agreement, not closer. And, Copenhagen perhaps signaled a move further from the UN 190+ nation process and closer to a process taking place at venues like the Major Economies Forum (MEF). Certainly, this is the desire of the U.S.; however, it remains to be seen whether the BASIC countries (Brazil, South Africa, India and China) will agree to this radical shift in negotiating venue. Regardless, it seems almost certain issues like the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM), sectoral offsets, Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Degradation (REDD), adaptation, and finance will likely remain within the UNFCCC negotiating structure.

Copenhagen made clear the goal of a comprehensive, legally binding agreement setting emission reduction targets for developed countries while requiring no action on the part of major developing economies ala the Kyoto Protocol, is not achievable. What is achievable is a process of bottom-up pledge and review where the major developed and developing countries agree to take domestic actions to limit their emissions, agree to some form of monitoring, reporting and verification (MRV), review these actions after a suitable period of time to see if everyone is abiding by their pledges, then pledge again. Pledge and review is not as elegant as Kyoto, but is a whole lot more practical.

While the Copenhagen Accord does include language setting an aspirational goal limiting emissions to 2 degrees C, one doubts whether anyone with a sense of politics finds that fact comforting. The GHG concentration at which we will eventually stabilize—and therefore the temperature rise that will be achieved—will not be predetermined neatly by science, but rather, by the messy business of politics and the reality of economics.

Adapting to New Negotiating Framework

As the major economies take the lead in forging agreements, and to the extent the venue for those negotiations moves beyond the UNFCCC to other processes, the interests of poor nations in issues of adaptation can become overlooked. The primary concern of the major economies in international negotiations is their emissions, not adaptation. Interest in adaptation and other issues particularly salient to developing countries are secondary concerns, largely due to the fact that most of the major economies (emitters) are reasonably developed (or well on their way) and will be able to adapt. Once the major economies take their mitigation negotiations out of the UNFCCC, the poor countries who will suffer climate impacts might end up talking to themselves about adaptation.

If the U.S. does not pass comprehensive legislation establishing a domestic cap-and-trade program that admits international offsets, a broad and deep global carbon market may fail to materialize. Absent such a market, the amount of wealth that will be transferred from the north to the south will be small and will get smaller over time. Without private sector money flowing to developing countries to purchase offsets the transfer of wealth will have to come from government tax revenues. In the U.S., and I expect elsewhere, it will be a very difficult political challenge to get these flows up to the levels needed and even more difficult to maintain those flows over time.

Long-term funding for adaptation will be particularly difficult to amass. While mitigation lends itself to a carbon market, there is not a private market analog for adaptation. Many adaptation projects look to the financier as straightforward economic development projects, where the risk tends to be high and rate of return low. Without private capital interest in these projects poor countries are left relying on highly uncertain developed country government funds.

U.S. Negotiating Position Post Copenhagen

If, as I believe, Copenhagen signals a very different process for reaching global climate agreements, the roles of the major economies will grow and the U.S. will have more opportunity to exercise leadership. Understanding the U.S. negotiating position going forward is aided by the simple fact that domestic climate policy and politics will form the proper foundation for foreign policy with respect to climate change. The Clinton administration let the formulation of climate foreign policy precede the development of domestic climate policy. Those actions angered the U.S. Senate and doomed the Kyoto Protocol in the U.S. The Obama administration will not make that mistake.

The U.S. negotiating stance going forward can be summed up with a few short sentences. The U.S. will attempt to establish the MEF as the venue for future mitigation agreement negotiations. The general form of the agreement sought will be pledge and review of Nationally Appropriate Mitigation Actions (NAMAs) by all MEF members with suitably strong MRV requirements. The Kyoto track within the UNFCCC will not be supported. Mitigation NAMAs for the U.S. will be identical to those passed by the U.S. Congress (whatever those actions might be). Since the U.S. NAMAs will be written into domestic law, the U.S. will hold these are legally binding on their own and therefore do not need to be included in a treaty; however, the U.S. would not block such a treaty should one be developed. If the U.S. Congress passes cap-and-trade legislation with international offsets, the U.S. will be able to deliver funds to developing countries for mitigation. REDD+ and sectoral offsets will be supported by the U.S. If domestic cap-and-trade legislation with international offsets is passed, REDD+ will be high on the negotiating priority list.

Raymond J. Kopp is a senior fellow and director of Resources for the Future’s Center for Climate and Electricity Policy.

Published: Mar-15-10 | 0 Comments

Mar10

U.S. Climate Policy and the Shape of International Agreements, Part 3

COP-15, International, United States

How the U.S. Approached Copenhagen and What Came of it

As I mentioned in my previous posts (here and here), this series will provide a view of Copenhagen from a distinctly American perspective, blending global economics with domestic U.S. politics. The outcome of Copenhagen and the international process that now follows is shaped largely by the domestic politics of all the major emitting countries with U.S. domestic politics playing a particularly large role.

In this post, I’ll take a closer look at where the U.S. stood in the run up to Copenhagen and how that led to some positive and negative outcomes from the conference.

Copenhagen Accord: The U.S Position going into Copenhagen

The U.S. negotiating position at Copenhagen reflected domestic political concerns. The foundation for the position was the constraint imposed by the White House that under no circumstances could the negotiating team appear to be pre-empting the U.S. Congress in setting emission reduction goals. The negotiators were free to utilize the reduction goals in Waxman-Markey (17 percent below 2005 levels in 2020, and 83 percent below 2005 levels in 2050), but they could not enter into negotiations over more stringent the goals. Thus, the U.S. team did not go to Copenhagen prepared to negotiate targets nor was it authorized to do so.

If the U.S. is to be a signatory to a new treaty serving as the successor to the Kyoto Protocol the new treaty would have to be ratified by the U.S. Senate. Ratification of international treaties requires 67 senators to vote in favor. As I said in my previous post, it is politically challenging to amass 60 votes to pass domestic climate legislation; clearly, it’s more difficult to amass 67 votes. Therefore, the negotiating team was prepared to make it clear that U.S. ratification of a Kyoto successor was highly unlikely. The U.S. negotiating position, developed over the past several years, sought the abandonment of the Berlin Mandate (the Mandate serves to exempt non-Annex 1 countries from any responsibility to reduce GHG emissions) and an agreement requiring all countries, and particularly countries participating in the Major Economies Forum (MEF), to agree to undertake a series of domestic mitigation actions and bind themselves legally to execute those actions. These actions, termed “Nationally Appropriate Mitigation Actions” (NAMAs) are of the countries’ own choosing. The binding international commitment would be reflected in the domestic enforcement of these actions under a country’s own laws. In addition, some sort of agreed to monitoring, reporting and verification (MRV) of the NAMAs would be required as part of the agreement.

Given the U.S. interest and focus on an agreement built around NAMAs, combined with the fact the U.S. is not a party to the Kyoto Protocol, progress along the Kyoto track (Ad Hoc Working Group on Further Commitments for Annex I Parties under the Kyoto Protocol (AWG-KP)) was not a part of the U.S. negotiating objectives. The U.S. was and is placing all its effort on the Ad Hoc Working Group on Long-Term Cooperative Action (AWG-LCA).

Since a handful of nations can block a UNFCCC agreement—as we saw at the end of COP-15 negotiations—the U.S. sees the process as severely dysfunctional with respect to global agreements to limit GHG emissions. The U.S. much prefers the MEF as the venue for collaboration and cooperation on international climate policy. Indeed, a “MEF Plus” that includes an additional half dozen or so representative developing countries giving the MEF a bit more international credibility would likely be welcomed by the U.S.

U.S. negotiators were supportive of policies to incentivize the conservation of forests to reduce emissions, known as REDD+, the establishment of a credible and efficient sectoral offset policy to accompany the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM), funds for developing countries to finance GHG mitigation and adaptation, and a robust global carbon market. Indeed, the carbon market is the primary mechanism by which U.S. funds (private sector dollars) would flow to developing countries for mitigation efforts. The U.S. was also supportive of the flow of government funds to aid mitigation and adaptation efforts; however, it is unlikely the U.S. would agree to the distribution of these funds via a process solely administered by the UN.

The Copenhagen Accord: What Went Well

From the U.S. perspective the Copenhagen Accord produced many good results. Perhaps the most important outcome was the agreement hammered out by the U.S. and the BASIC countries (Brazil, South Africa, India and China) to put forward NAMAs, enter those into an agreed upon registry, and the inclusion of some MRV language in the final agreement. While the actions contained in the registry at the current time are not enough to solve the climate problem, they are a step forward.

A 2 degree C maximum mean global temperature increase goal was agreed upon, providing an important long-term objective. Importantly, significant pledges of near and longer-term finance for mitigation and adaptation were made, even approaching the lower end of what is generally believed to be necessary. Pledged near-term finance (2010-2012) amounted to $30 billion while longer term pledges (2012-2020) were $100 billion.

What Went Poorly

On the negative side of the ledger six countries (out of the 190+ participating in the negotiations)—Sudan, Venezuela, Bolivia, Nicaragua, Cuba and Tuvalu—rejected the Accord and prevented it from being adopted as an official decision of the Conference of the Parties (COP). Parties agreeing to the Accord could only officially “take note.” This leaves a great deal of ambiguity with respect to the manner in which progress toward further development of the Accord can take place with the context of the UNFCCC.

Perhaps more worrisome, the negotiations almost certainly would have failed without direct intervention from heads of state. The severe dysfunctionality of the UNFCCC/COP process was clear, as ministers and countries’ representatives failed to make any progress in advance of the COP and the arrival of heads of state.

From a U.S. perspective key elements were missing from the text, specifically, 80 percent reduction target by developed countries by 2050, 50 percent global reduction by 2050, due primarily to developing country resistance, specifically China. Moreover, developing countries were unwilling to make the outcomes (NAMAs) legally binding and it is unclear whether they would ever do so.

Lots of discussions moved forward without having text adopted, including forestry, technology, adaptation and finance. These tracts needed more time and high-level engagement to be completed. Forestry seemed to move the furthest along; technology and intellectual property issues still need more development and thought, and the Copenhagen Green Climate Fund needs a good deal more elaboration prior to COP-16 in Mexico.

Raymond J. Kopp is a senior fellow and director of Resources for the Future’s Center for Climate and Electricity Policy.

Published: Mar-10-10 | 0 Comments

Mar09

International Climate Progress May Require Modified Focus

International

It will take strong leadership from all corners of the globe to pull together political will to move forward on an international climate treaty. According to a new German Marshall Fund report from RFF’s Nigel Purvis and Andrew Stevenson, ignoring the negotiating lessons learned in Copenhagen and falling back on the status quo could be the most dangerous course of action for the United States and Europe:

To protect the climate, a fundamental shift in thinking is essential. The most effective strategy would begin focusing, country-by-country, on advancing concrete mitigation actions that further broader sustainable development objectives. The keys to success for Europe and the United States in this new approach will be offering financial support on a pay-for-performance basis and aligning international trade policy with climate objectives.

Negotiating formal climate commitments via global talks must turn into an important but lesser priority, informed by realistic expectations about the extent and pace of likely progress. Moving from climate commitments to climate action is not without risk. Developing nations have opened the door, but this approach is untested.

Read Purvis and Stevenson’s Rethinking Climate Diplomacy: New Ideas for Transatlantic Cooperation post-Copenhagen here.

Published: Mar-09-10 | 0 Comments

Mar04

U.S. Climate Policy and the Shape of International Agreements, Part 2: Where Can the U.S. Go From Here?

COP-15, International, Congress

As I mentioned in my previous post, this series will provide a view of Copenhagen from a distinctly American perspective, blending global economics with domestic U.S. politics. The outcome of Copenhagen and the international process that now follows is shaped largely by the domestic politics of all the major emitting countries with U.S. domestic politics playing a particularly large role.

In this post, I’ll examine the suite of climate policy options before the U.S. and the circumstances that may influence the choices made by policymakers.

Plan A: President Obama exercises leadership and plays an active role in moving the stalled Senate negotiations forward.

Recognizing that regional differences will mean some Democrats will likely not support comprehensive GHG legislation, the president will have to form a bipartisan coalition of Democrats and Republicans to pass legislation in the Senate.

One legislative path forward for the president could be the new comprehensive climate bill being developed by Sens. John Kerry (Democrat), Joseph Lieberman (Independent), and Lindsey Graham (Republican). The trio of senators has released very little descriptive information regarding the structure of the climate legislation it would propose, but the senators have acknowledged the importance of an economy-wide price on GHG emissions (favored by the president), strengthened incentives for nuclear power and coal-fired electricity generation with carbon capture and storage technology, widely-known as “clean coal”, perhaps putting nuclear power on an equal footing with zero-carbon generation technologies like wind and solar, and expanded domestic oil and gas exploration and extraction.

A second path forward for the president is recent interest in the legislation co-sponsored by Sens. Maria Cantwell (Democrat) and Susan Collins (Republican). A scant 39 pages compared, to the 1500-page heft of the House’s Waxman-Markey (W-M) bill, the Cantwell-Collins legislation is considerably more straightforward and less complex. It would establish a comprehensive cap-and-trade program like W-M, but all allowances would be auctioned and the allowance trading provisions are quite restrictive compared to W-M. Three-quarters of the auction revenue would be distributed to legal residents on the basis of equal per capita shares. The remaining quarter would fund a variety of research programs and help heavily impacted industries. Importantly, the legislation would have a very robust price collar initially limiting allowance price movements to the $7 to $21 range.

Plan B: It becomes too difficult politically to pass a comprehensive climate bill that includes a price on carbon as one of the core components and some combination of policies, excluding an economy-wide cap on GHG emissions is put in place.

Many moderate senators in both parties want to pass an energy bill that would have some impact on GHGs, but avoids politically unacceptable increases in energy prices that would come about from a cap-and-trade policy.

Energy legislation consistent with these desires has already been crafted by the Senate Energy and Natural Resources Committee and would likely be one major component of Plan B. That legislation would, in part, significantly increase government funding to energy research and development, establish a national renewable portfolio standard for electricity at 15 percent of all generation capacity by 2021, establish federal authority over new transmission capacity perhaps over-riding state authority, deploy many new energy efficiency policies, and open the Eastern Gulf of Mexico to oil and gas production. While the emissions analysis of this legislation has not been undertaken, there is reason to believe the legislation would have a significant impact on U.S. GHG emissions.

The second component of Plan B involves the regulation of transport emissions under the nation’s Clean Air Act using tailpipe standards. The U.S. Supreme Court ruled in 2007 the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) has the authority to regulate carbon dioxide emissions from transport under the Clean Air Act and EPA is developing regulations now.

The final component of the Plan B concerns the emissions from electricity generation. A separate piece of legislation could be developed to set up a cap-and-trade program for carbon dioxide emissions from just the electric power sector. Alternatively, the president may choose to use the existing authority of the Clean Air Act to regulate power plant emissions through technology standards, or it may be possible to establish a workable electricity sector cap-and-trade program within the existing Clean Air Act structure.

Plan B would be a piecemeal approach, likely inefficient when compared to a comprehensive cap-and-trade approach, and producing unknown emission reductions. But, if electric power generation were included via its own cap-and-trade program, Plan B would target the major emitting sectors and could have quite meaningful impact on U.S. emissions.

Plan C: Continue on a largely business-as-usual course for the near term.

Plan C is the path of least political resistance and the path of least emission reduction. Since it requires little economic or political sacrifice, the energy legislation of Plan B passes into law under Plan C. Legislative action of one form or another to pre-empt the authority of the Clean Air Act to regulate carbon dioxide emissions moves forward and is successful. Such action is planned, but the odds it will be successful are long. With the energy legislation passed and the Clean Air Act pre-empted, an argument can be made there are no remaining viable political paths and the U.S. takes no substantive action on climate change in the near term.

However, there may be a Plan D. President Obama has created by executive order the National Commission on Fiscal Responsibility and Reform to examine the huge federal deficit and likely make recommendations for tax reform to address the deficit. There is a chance GHG control policy could be recast in the next Congress as deficit reduction policy where revenues from carbon taxes or auctioned allowances are used to reduce the deficit.

Raymond J. Kopp is a senior fellow and director of Resources for the Future’s Center for Climate and Electricity Policy.

Published: Mar-04-10 | 0 Comments

Feb22

Will Bolivia Lead a New Climate Diplomacy?

International

On February 10, the European Union Parliament called for a “new climate diplomacy” where a coordinated EU strategy will work closely with progressive developing and emerging economies. Bolivia’s leadership thinks it's about time.

In January, populist Bolivian President Evo Morales announced a three-day conference on climate change to serve as an alternative to Copenhagen. The meeting will focus on the rights of indigenous peoples and climate debt—something major, developed emitters owe the rest of the world. Bolivia, one of the poorest countries in South America, will host the climate forum in April in Cochabamba, the city famous for the 2000 “Water Wars” against the privatization of municipal water supply. David Choquehuanca, Bolivia's foreign minister, expects around 5,000 foreigners to attend the April event including activists, scientists, and public servants.

“Bolivia was one of the very few delegations that brought indigenous people to Copenhagen in order to show that talks shouldn't be top-down," says Claudia Aßmann, a consultant with the Bolivian government who joined the delegation in Copenhagen. Aßmann emphasizes that climate debt is a crucial part of Bolivia’s climate change policy strategy as outlined by their chief climate negotiator Angelica Navarro. Navarro defines Bolivia's goals as persuading developed nations to establish and fulfill domestic emissions reductions, finance large-scale adaptation projects, and technological transfer to developing countries. Migration and climate refugees are also among the topics to be discussed in April.

What Brought Bolivia Here

Politics and financial motives aside, Bolivia has already documented the negative side-effects of changing global temperatures.

As this New York Times video from last December shows, Bolivia’s 18,000-year-old Chacaltaya glacier, which once boasted the world’s highest ski resort, melted in 2009 ten years earlier than scientists predicted. Glaciers are an important source of water for nearby cities which already face supply issues. Rapid growth in cities, municipal mismanagement, and glaciers melting because of climate change creates more stress on this developing country's infrastructure.

Last year, the Guardian profiled Bolivia’s Uru Chipaya, a native tribe that lived through the Spanish conquest, but might not survive climate change. While some members of the Uru Chipaya blame the deities for the recent droughts that devastated their population, President Morales is channeling that frustration toward the developed world.

In November, CNN also reported on Bolivia adding that it is elderly women in the rural areas who bear the greatest burden of climate change as men and young women migrate to the cities. UNFPA Executive Director Thoraya Ahmed Obaid writes in a UNFPA 2009 report that "poor women in poor countries are among the hardest hit by climate change even though they contributed the least to it."

Whether the EU or Bolivia can truly create a new climate diplomacy is to be seen. In the meantime, many indigenous populations in developing countries must find a way to cope with climate change with or without international assistance.

Aysha Ghadiali is a Research Associate at Resources for the Future.

Published: Feb-22-10 | 2 Comments

Feb10

A 'Stern' Assessment of Copenhagen

China, COP-15, Congress, International

Top U.S. climate negotiator Todd Stern didn’t mince words Tuesday when urging a group of key international players to sign on to the Copenhagen Accord, suggesting that not doing so would risk turning the nascent text into a “stillborn.”

In remarks delivered at Center for American Progress (video here), Stern said he’s confident the negotiating bloc known as BASIC—Brazil, China, India and South Africa—will come around to the Accord, given “the clear assent their leaders gave to the Accord in Copenhagen.”

The 194 nations party to the United Nations’ climate change negotiations had until (roughly) January 31 to submit their emissions reductions plans. According to the U.S. Climate Action Network, some 95 countries representing 80 percent of the world’s emissions—including the members of the BASIC bloc—have associated themselves with the Accord.

But as Andrew shrewdly pointed a few weeks back, a joint statement issued by the BASIC nations certainly isn’t making the Copenhagen Accord negotiating process any easier:

It appears that these countries are willing to submit their actions, as pledged in the Accord, but do not view this submission as implying any “association”—at least in the sense likely envisioned by the UN secretariat and most developed countries. Even if China, India, Brazil and South Africa technically “associate”, they do not see this as creating any obligations under the UNFCCC (such as the submission of targets, which they claim to do voluntarily), and certainly not as giving the Accord legitimacy as a negotiating text. It seems that in their view, they made a political pledge in Copenhagen to submit their actions—which just happened to be included in the Accord—and they will do so in order to uphold that pledge, but they will not do so because it is an obligation created by the Accord.

Despite his pointed remarks, Stern didn’t turn a blind eye to the U.S. domestic climate policy landscape. He urged Congress to pass strong energy and climate legislation this year saying doing so would provide negotiators “a foundation of both leverage and credibility.” He quick to emphasize, however, that he believed further progress on the Copenhagen Accord was possible—and indeed critical—absent U.S. legislation.

He drew two key contrasts between using the Accord and returning to the two tracks of the Copenhagen process. The first was the past versus the future—that returning to the two track Copenhagen process negotiations means continuing to live in a world where development and emissions levels in 1992 are all that matter. This should not be the case, and the Copenhagen Accord reflects both how the world has changed since then—a “developing” country is now the world’s largest polluter—and how it will change in the future—by covering the countries that will be responsible for 97 percent of the world’s emissions growth through 2030.

Stern also drew a sharp divide between negotiations in the UNFCCC—carried out by career negotiators and going nowhere—and the Copenhagen Accord—carried out by heads of state and able to crack a few key issues in a short time. Given this experience, why should the former continue to be more important than the latter? If the goal is progress, why not stick with how progress was actually achieved? Of course, the implication is that some nations prefer delay.

The critical point here is that, perhaps partly because of the uncertainty in Congress, Stern is trying to paint the BASIC nations into a corner in an effort to secure a more pragmatic approach to negotiations in 2010. By arguing that the Accord represents science and progress, and that the two track negotiations represent favoring procedure and living in the past, he is setting up a more fundamental choice that should not inherently depend on one country or another’s mitigation plans (even one as important as the United States). Ultimately, because this is not just a negotiating tactic but also the right thing to do from a scientific perspective, the United States may succeed after all. There is no doubt, however, that there will be plenty of diplomatic fireworks first.

Andrew Stevenson, a research assistant at Resources for the Future and regular contributor to Common Tragedies, contributed to this post.

Tiffany Clements is managing editor of Weathervane.

Published: Feb-10-10 | 0 Comments

Jan28

Guilty by Voluntary Association

COP-15, International

Negotiation image courtesy dwonderwall via Flickr The first deliverable in the Copenhagen Accord was a pledge by all nations to submit their planned mitigation actions or targets to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) secretariat by January 31, 2010. Since nations “took note” of the Accord instead of adopting it, in the weeks after Copenhagen there was uncertainty about whether some countries would ignore this quasi-commitment. Even UNFCCC head honcho Yvo de Boer was concerned, calling the deadline “soft” while imploring nations to “associate” themselves with the Accord. “Association” was likely understood to mean acknowledgement of some formal status for the Accord within the UNFCCC, giving the secretariat greater authority to convene official negotiating sessions around the document.

In any case, from the perspective of developed nations the central task for 2010 was to merge any new discussions around the Copenhagen Accord with the Kyoto Protocol (KP) and long-term cooperative action (LCA) negotiating tracks that were created by the Bali Action Plan in 2007 and intended to be the fundamental basis for negotiating an agreement in Copenhagen. While countries made progress on these tracks in Copenhagen—including things like forestry and adaptation—when they “took note” of the Accord on the last night of COP-15 they essentially left all that progress on the table to be taken up in 2010. Many developing countries wanted, and still want, to just pick up where they left off on these texts and pretend the Accord never happened.

If all key countries “associated” themselves with the Accord, one theory was that this would streamline the process of merging the Accord with KP and LCA by giving it at least some level of official status. For many developed countries, it was hoped that this would lead to the dissolution of these tracks and the use of the Accord as the new basis for negotiating a comprehensive global agreement. The fundamental developed-developing distinction of Kyoto would fall by the wayside, and the new starting point could eventually lead to the only kind of agreement the United States might be able to ratify. This is why some international policy wonks in the United States were so excited about Copenhagen.

However, one assumption implicit in this was that submission of targets or actions would necessarily go hand-in-hand with association, and vice versa. If a country wanted to “associate” itself with the Accord, it would entail accepting the Accord’s obligations, including the submission of a target. If a country submitted a target that would also imply acceptance of the Accord’s obligations and indicate that a country wished to be “associated” with the Accord going forward. In turn, it was thought that a country could not “associate” itself with the Accord without acknowledging it had some kind of official status.

As expected, by Monday nearly all developed countries, including the United States, will have both submitted their target and expressed their willingness to be associated with the Accord. Many of these targets are on the lower end of what was conditionally proposed (Europe 20 percent instead of 30 percent below 1990 levels by 2020, Australia 5 percent below 2000 levels by 2020) and come with numerous strings attached (Japan 25 percent below 1990 levels by 2020 with a global agreement), but they are on the table and show a commitment both to the Accord’s obligations and using it as a primary focus of negotiations in 2010.

However, a recent joint statement from the BASIC countries (Brazil, China, India and South Africa) presents a more complicated situation, and reveals that the association-with-action-implies-acceptance-of-some-official-status assumption is highly suspect, if not outright false. It appears that these countries are willing to submit their actions, as pledged in the Accord, but do not view this submission as implying any “association”—at least in the sense likely envisioned by the UN secretariat and most developed countries. Even if China, India, Brazil and South Africa technically “associate”, they do not see this as creating any obligations under the UNFCCC (such as the submission of targets, which they claim to do voluntarily), and certainly not as giving the Accord legitimacy as a negotiating text. It seems that in their view, they made a political pledge in Copenhagen to submit their actions—which just happened to be included in the Accord—and they will do so in order to uphold that pledge, but they will not do so because it is an obligation created by the Accord.

While this does not mean the Accord is “dead”, it does have implications for the negotiating process in 2010. For starters, it would be a heck of a lot easier to negotiate a binding agreement in Cancun, at least one that would be preferable to the United States, if all countries formally “associated” themselves and understood that “association” to create legitimacy and obligations. The reality of the BASIC position makes Mexico’s already delicate task—massaging the two-track UNFCCC process and Copenhagen Accord process together in a way that satisfies 190+ countries—that much more difficult. As a positive sign, they appear to understand the difficulty of this task and be up to taking it on. It will require delicate diplomacy that escaped the Danes, but the fact that Mexico is a “developing” country and OECD member could give it the needed climate cred to make it happen.

Observing this dance will require tracking both any “friends of the Accord” processes that occur outside or on the sidelines of the UNFCCC (and seeing who shows up, what they say and how), and tracking how key elements of the Accord are discreetly worked into the two official tracks. If anything, it will be fascinating to watch.

Andrew Stevenson is a research assistant at Resources for the Future and regular contributor to Common Tragedies.

Published: Jan-28-10 | 0 Comments

Jan19

Show me the Money (in the Context of Meaningful Mitigation Actions and Transparency on Implementation)

COP-15, Congress, International, United States

Money image courtesy lillit via Flickr Post-Copenhagen, securing and managing financing for adaptation, mitigation and technology transfer could well become the most prominent issue in international climate negotiations in 2010, and become a much bigger issue domestically than it was in 2009 legislative discussions.

Internationally, financing is likely to be one of the issues that sees the most action in 2010 climate negotiations for several reasons. First, the Copenhagen Accord calls for immediate activity on structuring and distributing funds, and work may be able to proceed on this front while talks are stalled on broader issues. Second, making good on the $30 billion short-term fund will be critical to rebuilding global cooperation that has been threatened by the divisive Copenhagen conference. Third, the host of this year’s main climate summit, Mexico, has always been a leader on financing. They are likely to want a deliverable from the conference on their flagship issue.

At home, President Obama now has to ask Congress to help make good on their part of the $30 billion commitment—likely to be $6-7.5 billion from 2010-2012—with a substantial portion dedicated toward a $1 billion 2010-2012 pledge for reducing deforestation. He will also need to ensure that any comprehensive domestic effort includes enough long-term financing to support the $100 billion Secretary of State Hillary Clinton pledged to help mobilize in the context of a global agreement (with a likely U.S. share of about $20 billion). This will require action on two fronts: substantially ramping-up appropriations for international climate activities from their current level of approximately $1 billion, and, more importantly, placing one of his biggest bets yet on cap and trade.

Indeed, if legislation similar to Waxman-Markey or Kerry-Boxer were enacted, the private financing mobilized through offsets would easily allow the president to reach his financing goals. However, under various “Plan B” scenarios being discussed, financing will be the loser. While it is likely that a more limited climate bill, a so-called “energy only” bill or even the Clean Air Act would allow the United States to meet its 2020 mitigation pledge, it is unclear how these mechanisms would mobilize dedicated streams of international climate financing on the scale of economy-wide cap and trade.

While the appropriations process may be able to handle a short-term bump over three years for the Copenhagen prompt-start funding, it is likely to buckle under the strain of an attempt to double the U.S. foreign assistance budget solely for international climate activities. Under these “Plan B” domestic policy scenarios, this could lead to three outcomes: 1) Robbing from Peter to pay Paul (i.e. diverting large amounts of foreign assistance from some other activity to climate), 2) Failure to secure a binding international agreement (the fragile Accord would never have been reached without Clinton’s $100 billion pledge), or 3) The introduction of a new mechanism to raise dedicated public or private financing under an alternative U.S. climate policy scenario.

Since the first two outcomes are clearly unsuitable for those looking to pursue international climate agreements, this should create a major push among supporters for the international aspects of economy-wide cap and trade, specifically the set-asides and offsets that have taken a backseat thus far to domestic economic concerns. Either that, or policymakers need to begin the process of thinking through alternative mechanisms to raise funds under other possible comprehensive climate and energy policies. Given the likely increased focus on financing internationally in the immediate future, time for both is short.

Andrew Stevenson is a research assistant at Resources for the Future and regular contributor to Common Tragedies.

Published: Jan-19-10 | 0 Comments

Jan07

Post-Holiday Post-Mortem: Surveying the Wreckage of COP-15

COP-15, International, China, United States, REDD

Pony image courtesy Cheesy42 via Flickr

If I may, I’d like to start with a holiday-appropriate metaphor. Let’s pretend that you are convinced you’re getting a pony for Christmas. You’re absolutely sure of it; the momentum built up from the Christmas presents of years past is too strong for this year’s gift to be anything but a pony. As the year creeps closer to Christmas morning, you see warning signs that suggest you might not get your pony this year. Mom and Dad are struggling to make ends meet, the pony market is down overall, and you live in a high-rise apartment. Regardless, you keep thinking that pony is coming because it has to. This is the year of the pony.

When Christmas comes, you rush downstairs to find … no pony. All you got was a pair of socks. They’re nice socks. Thick and warm, they’re made of SmartWool, so they’ll keep your feet dry. They will be great socks to wear the day when you eventually get a pony. Your friend, who wasn’t expecting to get anything for Christmas got the same socks and is actually pretty stoked, considering he didn’t expect to get anything. It doesn’t matter to you, though, because you had your heart set on a pony and all you got was a stupid pair of socks. Worst December ever.

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When people ask me how Copenhagen turned out, I tell them it depends on what they were expecting going in. For some, expectations for the conference were huge, a-pony-for-Christmas huge. So, it shouldn’t be a surprise that many of them view the results as a dismal failure. Negotiations on text for what would have become the Copenhagen Agreement or Protocol (or whatever official sounding name for a document you prefer) did not progress well enough over the course of the year to produce a great outcome at COP-15.

The U.N. tried to lower expectations in the preceding months, and after meetings in Bangkok and Barcelona, it was pretty clear Copenhagen was not going to deliver on what many were hoping for, namely legally binding emissions targets. The Copenhagen Accord, the result of two weeks’ worth of brain-numbing negotiations and some impressive ad hoc diplomacy by President Obama, to turned out to be something like (to stick with the metaphor) a comfortable pair of warm socks: underwhelming and perhaps disappointing to a lot of people, but still useful, probably more helpful than we realize, and something on which we can stand in the future.

What actually came out the meeting? The Copenhagen Accord, a three-page document that reiterates the international community’s commitment to reduce emissions enough to prevent a 2 degree Celsius rise in global temperatures. It asks developed and developing countries to commit to mitigation actions under the basic structure of the Kyoto Protocol (and submit them by January 31), and establishes a framework for monitoring, reporting, and verifying nations’ emissions reductions. Along with recognizing the importance of reducing emissions for deforestation and forest degradation (REDD) and market approaches to emissions reductions, it also establishes mechanisms through which developed countries can provide financial support to developing countries for adaptation purposes.

The Accord, while not officially adopted by the Conference, will help move the process forward. Before you start making hotel reservations in Mexico City for December, let’s take a look back on some the important things we saw in Copenhagen and how they might affect the process moving forward.

Do we need to scrap the COP? – If there was one thing that was pretty clear after two weeks in the snow and fog of Copenhagen, it’s that the current structure for international negotiations is very limited in what it can achieve. It would be difficult to get 193 nations to agree on something trivial like who was the best Bond (quite obviously Connery), so getting them to agree on how best stop a global catastrophe is not going to be a walk in the park. The UNFCCC structures and processes, however, make progress painfully difficult at times.

The final result of the COP is a perfect example. After weeks of arguments, stalemates, and walkouts, it took five heads of state trapped in a room together (President Obama and the leaders of Brazil, China, South Africa, and India, also called BASIC) to come up with three pages of somewhat vague agreements to be solidified at a later date. Most of the plenary was happy enough to have some kind of outcome and voted to approve the politically binding (not legally) Accord. To adopt an accord, however, requires a unanimous vote of approval from the delegates. Venezuela, Bolivia, Nicaragua, Cuba, and Sudan all felt that the Accord developed by the big kids did not include their particular interests or they were not properly consulted, and at least four of them voted against the Accord. Thus, instead of adopting it, the COP took note of the Accord, meaning that it acknowledges its existence and COP members can voluntarily comply with it, but it currently has no legal authority. None of this means that the Accord is not significant, but it shows how fragile COP proceedings can be. All it takes it one cheesed-off country (or one that is scared of economic specters) to stand between the world and a binding international climate agreement.

So are there alternatives? Indeed there are and they may become more attractive as nations look to move forward from Copenhagen. It’s clear that the complexities of climate change are a bit overwhelming for the UNFCCC process. Parallel conversations need to happen to more effectively address major issues and disagreements. As I said before, the Accord was written between the U.S. and BASIC. Those nations represent more than 50 percent of the world’s CO2 emissions. Throw the EU, Japan, and the rest of the world’s 17 largest economies and you have over 90 percent of emissions represented in one room that is much smaller and more manageable than the Bella Center. Dialogues between these critical nations can help break some of the loggerheads encountered in the COP discussions. There are two possible avenues through which parallel negotiations can help:

Bilateral and multi-lateral talks: What if the U.S. and China went into Copenhagen with a semi-formal agreement for technology sharing and measurement, reporting and verification (MRV)? Or if the EU worked out a deal with Brazil, South Africa, and Indonesia for funding programs for REDD and adaptation that could easily be plugged into UNFCCC institutions? Major emitters working directly with each other to smooth out differences and reach understandings before entering COP negotiations may help cut down on the static and grease the skids for legally binding outcomes that robustly address major issues.

Major Economies Forum: About that smaller room I mentioned earlier. The MEF can play a substantial role in advancing COP discussions if it wants to. It can provide a more intimate setting in which the U.S. and EU can talk about monitoring emissions and trade restrictions with China and India without the chaos and pressure of the COP negotiations. The MEF also does not have entrenched categories of Annex I and Non-Annex I countries that were established by the Kyoto Protocol, so the distinctions between developed (US, EU, Japan, etc.) and emerging (BASIC and others) are more flexible and can better reflect the economic realities in each nation.

These suggestions are not advocating a total dismantling or abandonment of the UNFCCC process. Instead, these negotiations can occur outside the process, but the end results can be designed so they can easily plug into on-going COP discussions. There will likely be issues regarding equity for developing countries and many of them will probably resent not being actively involved in the process. But going outside the COP may lead to significant progress on climate change and could also spur action within the COP as well. If you don’t want to take my word for it, you can listen to Rob Stavins and Joe Romm instead.

Et tu, China? – Going into Copenhagen, it looked like the U.S. was once again going to end up looking like the bad guy. Leave it to China to beat us at our own game. Without the U.S. to hide behind anymore, China—and India to a lesser extent—stepped forward to block huge progress. For the two weeks of the COP, China stonewalled and refused to budge on its demands for the developed world. Then in the final hours, when things got real with the various heads of state, China showed the proceedings exactly how serious it was taking things by sending a mid-level official to talk to the leaders of the other nations. Even after Obama managed to track down Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao and get him talking, China still vetoed the inclusion of language requiring a 50 percent reduction in total global emissions and 80 percent reduction from developed countries by 2050. Following the meeting, British Climate Secretary Ed Miliband called China out for trying to hijack the conference and being an obstacle to progress.

China’s actions, while discouraging, are not entirely surprising. It had all the leverage in this situation. Unlike other countries like Brazil and, to some extent the U.S., there was no domestic political pressure for the Chinese to reach a deal. The Chinese know they are key to any international agreement, and they know how big a role they play in U.S. domestic climate debates. Why should they move when they hold all the cards? It is also pretty clear that the Chinese have no desire to be an international leader on climate change. They have announced what they consider strong reductions (45 percent reduction in carbon intensity by 2020) and they have been going nuts on the renewable energy front, but they don’t want to commit to anything that’s going to cut into their economic growth over the next few decades. If the U.S. and EU are looking to form some kind of coalition of the willing for climate change, they’d be better off going after Brazil, Indonesia, and other emerging economies first. Everyone else might have to be on board first before the Chinese decide to play.

The more things change, the more they stay the same – The Obama administration entered 2009 looking to reclaim American leadership on climate change. The U.S. was engaged and negotiating in good faith for the first time in eight years. But, ever the realist, Obama wouldn’t sign anything that has no chance of passing the Senate. Consequently, U.S. negotiators would not commit to anything that was not laid out in domestic legislation. What domestic legislation am I talking about? Well, uhh …

It’s pretty simple. The world can’t take effective action without the U.S., and the U.S. can’t act effectively without domestic legislation. Things cannot move forward until the Senate acts. Obama cannot make “transformative and inspiring commitments” that will not pass a filibuster vote, let alone the 67 votes needed to ratify an international treaty. Copenhagen may have some effect on the Senate debate in 2010, and that debate will loom very large over future COPs just as it did in Copenhagen.

REDD in the face – If you followed our on-the-ground reporting, then you know the silver lining in all the chaos and tomfoolery was the advances in REDD and protecting tropical forests. The negotiations regarding the REDD text were consistently the most promising. While a final agreement was not reached, there were some promising developments. First, the U.S., Australia, Japan, Norway, Britain, and France pledged $3.5 billion for REDD programs over the next three years. Second, the Accord acknowledged how important REDD is to achieving robust emissions reductions and discussions are going to continue into the future. There are still some issues to iron out, like national vs. sub-national monitoring systems, but saving the forests was one of the rare things on which almost everyone could agree. Insert tree-hugging hippie joke here.

Copenhagen was a disappointment in a lot of ways, and a disaster in some ways (I’m not going to talk about logistical problems here), but it had real outcomes that matter. It is not the solution many were hoping for, and the world is currently a long way away from keeping temperature rises from 2 degrees Celsius. But things are moving forward. Think of Copenhagen as a baby step, with really nice wool socks.

Daniel F. Morris is a Research Associate with Resources for the Future and a regular contributor to Common Tragedies

Published: Jan-07-10 | 2 Comments

Dec31

Looking to 2010

United States, Congress, International

With 2009 waning and 2010 revving up, it’s an opportune time to reflect on the stories, issues and ideas that shaped the climate debate in 2009 and look forward to its evolution in 2010.

Put a cap on it. Capitalizing on a democratic majority and working with interests across the ideological and economic spectrum, House Speaker Nancy Pelosi—with undeniable assistance from Rep. Henry Waxman—managed to pass historic climate and energy legislation in the House in June, 2009.

But since its passage, the bill has struggled to move forward in the Senate, taking a back seat to financial and health care reforms. And despite a tri-partisan effort and momentum from Copenhagen, late last week, Sen. Mary Landrieu, D-La.—speaking on behalf of some half-dozen moderate Democrats—said she can’t stomach a fight over cap-and-trade legislation.

Meanwhile, compelled by a 2007 Supreme Court ruling and recent endangerment finding, the EPA is moving concurrently to mitigate emissions of some six dangerous greenhouse gasses. Many, including business leaders and even EPA Administrator Lisa Jackson, say this regulation is less than ideal. But in the absence of congressional action, the agency will proceed with its policy development. Still, plenty expect the outcome to be different than expected.

The shifting scales of global leadership. The United States is no longer the world’s top emitter. Consequently, the U.S. doesn’t stand at center stage alone any longer in climate talks. With China growing, elevating its population to a new standard of living and searching for a green path forward, international dynamics are changing.

Finger pointing seems to have dissipated slightly in the wake of this month’s climate change conference in Copenhagen. However, blame for the conference’s flop has been lobbed in China’s direction. As the country straddles a line between developing nation and world superpower, it finds itself with new responsibilities and challenges.

Putting up green to green the planet. This year saw some lofty commitments from world leaders who have undertaken responsibilities to not only transition their developed economies to low-carbon futures, but also assist developing nations in growing their economies in a green way.

But with unprecedented economic woes at home, how can U.S. officials convince Congress and the public the investments being made are good ones?

As for the big questions of 2010, Financial Times’ Energy Source has pulled together some thoughts. Meanwhile, Grist recaps the biggest environmental stories of the ‘00s. You can expect Weathervane to keep an eye on these issues and plenty more in the coming year.

Have a happy and safe new year.

Tiffany Clements is managing editor of Weathervane.

Published: Dec-31-09 | 0 Comments

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