May11

Catching up Before the Senate's Climate Bill

Congress, Kerry-Boxer

 

After months of anticipation and speculation, the release of the Senate's comprehensive climate and energy legislation is upon us. But what can you make of the ballyhooed bill once the pages are finally in your hands tomorrow?

 

The Progressive Fix today wrapped up Danny Morris and Nathan Richardson's primer, Cheat Sheet for Climate Policy. There are many complex factors in play here, so go check it out. Danny and Nathan walk you through the essential considerations for legislation, the important ones, the negotiable elements, and what could distract from the passage of a quality bill. And in case you've lost track of the big picture throughout the bills sputters and stalls in the last few months, Dave Roberts breaks down the state of political play over at Grist.

 

That should keep you busy for the rest of the day.

Published: May-11-10 | 0 Comments

Apr01

Plan B for Climate Policy?

Cap and Trade, Congress, Kerry-Boxer, Cap and Dividend

 

Because thoughtful commentary should be widely-distributed, because we here at Weathervane are always thrilled to see our contributors lighting up the blogosphere and because the kind folks at the Progressive Fix (where the post originally appeared) said we could repost, we’re pleased to bring you this breakdown of the “Cantwell-Collins” bill—the first in a series examining legislative alternatives to cap and trade from Danny Morris.

 

You may not have noticed lately, but there are other major legislative initiatives, including climate and energy, on the Senate’s docket. One climate action bill that has received a lot of attention is the bill sponsored by Sens. Maria Cantwell (D-WA) and Susan Collins (R-ME). When the bill, officially called the Carbon Limits and Energy for America’s Renewal (CLEAR) Act, was first introduced in December, it caught the eye of some in the enviroblog world, but didn’t make much of an immediate splash in the Senate. Between the long build-up of the Kerry-Lieberman-Graham multi-partisan grab bag and the poorly understood Copenhagen outcome, however, it filled a vacuum with a poorly appreciated concept at the time: offsetting costs of climate legislation to consumers by cutting them a check.

 

The Basics

 

Also known as “cap-and-dividend,” the Cantwell-Collins bill is pretty simple: starting in 2012, it would mandate monthly auctions of pollution permits, called carbon shares, to the first seller (producer or importer) of fossil fuel carbon into the economy. The bill sets a floor price (shares can’t be sold for less) of $7 and a ceiling price (shares can’t be sold more) of $21 in the first auction in 2012, with the cap lowering — leading to rising prices — over time.

 

Most of the revenue from these auctions is distributed back to citizens in the form of a monthly check, while the rest is placed in a Clean Energy Refund Trust (CERT) fund established by the bill for use on a variety of different purposes: energy R&D, climate change adaptation, non-CO2 greenhouse gas reductions, international forestry and agriculture offsets, carbon capture and storage projects. First sellers cannot trade carbon shares and carbon derivatives are prohibited. In addition, the legislation has economy-wide emissions reduction goals of 20 percent below 2005 levels in 2020, 42 percent in 2030, and 83 percent in 2050.


The Good

 

Advocates of Cantwell-Collins praise it for being simple and transparent. As has been noted by others, it is a mere 40 pages, certainly an easier read than Waxman-Markey, the behemoth, 1,400-page cap-and-trade bill passed by the House last June. It regulates fossil fuel-related CO2 as far “upstream” in the economic supply chain as possible, meaning that whoever produces or imports a fossil fuel is on the hook for the CO2 content. Under Cantwell-Collins, coal mines and oil producers are responsible for paying for carbon, which means that only about 3,000 facilities need to be regulated. This upstream approach is administratively more streamlined, affecting far fewer parties than Waxman-Markey, which regulates electricity producers, natural gas distributors and manufacturers (over 75,000 regulated facilities).

 

The CLEAR Act also rejects the convoluted system of free and auctioned allocations in Waxman-Markey for a straight-up auction of all carbon shares. All regulated parties must participate in open monthly auctions, the revenue from which is split 75-25 percent: 75 percent is redistributed per capita to every American citizen and 25 percent is placed in the CERT. Whether you agree with the approach or not, offering to cut a monthly check for every U.S. citizen is not a bad way to gain some political support. Also, from the perspective of regulated firms, the use of price floors and ceilings, also known as a price collar, would reduce future price uncertainty and help them better predict investment needs.

 

Finally, the bill is co-sponsored by a Republican and a Democrat. That bipartisan provenance could certainly help its chances for passage.

 

The Bad

 

So with a bill that’s easy to read, easy to monitor and easy on the wallet, is there anyone who won’t like it? Well, anyone who favors hard targets for emissions reductions and anyone who believes in markets, for two. First, while the bill establishes economy-wide reduction goals as strong as Waxman-Markey, the auction system alone will not reach them. National emissions are capped at 2012 (note that it only caps CO2 emissions, unlike Waxman-Markey, which covered other greenhouse gases as well), and the cap doesn’t tighten until 2015, at which point it decreases by 0.25 percent that year, then by an additional 0.25 percent every corresponding year (so in 2016, the cap reduces by 0.5 percent, in 2017, 0.75 percent, etc).

 

This slow lowering of the cap will result in only five percent reductions below 2012 emissions by 2020, well short of the 20 percent reductions by 2020 goal. Even at that, the cap is not rock solid due to the price collar, which functions as a sort of safety valve. That is, if the auction price goes higher than the established ceiling price, then that essentially releases extra carbon shares for firms to bid on until the price falls back below the ceiling.

 

That means the remaining reductions to be met in 2020 will have to come from technology advances, land use offsets in forestry and agriculture, and reductions of non-CO2 gases, all of which are paid for by the CERT (which will be administered by the Department of Treasury). If we assume an initial carbon price of $15 in 2012 (a middle-range price, based on analyses done by the EPA and EIA), and the projected cap of roughly 7.2 billion carbon shares, then the CERT will get about $27 billion in the first year of the program.

 

That’s $27 billion to be split among all the uses listed above to help reduce emissions, as well as adaptation projects, energy efficiency efforts, and support for trade-sensitive industries and low-income families. The problem with a bill that’s only 40 pages is that it doesn’t have a lot of room for details — indeed, the CLEAR Act provides no guidance on how to prioritize uses of CERT funds. Although CERT funds will increase as the price of carbon shares rise, it will likely not even be close to enough to compensate for the majority of necessary carbon reductions.

 

A carbon market could mobilize private capital to help address some of these issues efficiently, instead of leaving all the choices and funding responsibility to the federal government. While it’s understandable that the public and politicians might still distrust markets in the wake of the recent financial collapse, the fact is that when it comes to finding inefficiencies and catalyzing innovation, nothing works better. But the market in Cantwell-Collins is very limited. Regulated firms can trade their permits, but only with each other and, unlike in Waxman-Markey, carbon derivative trading is strictly prohibited to regulated firms (they can be traded in a secondary market). These restrictions are going to severely limit the efficacy of the program to find the cheapest emissions reductions.

 

Also, there is a huge amount of risk in carbon markets (both in terms of accurate compliance and extreme events), so while they should be tightly regulated, derivatives are a necessary component because they allow firms to hedge against the risk of non-compliance or shifting standards. You will be hard-pressed to find any industry player who will advocate for a market without any trading, and there will need to be at least some industry support for any viable future climate legislation. Moreover, the monthly auction system may generate more carbon share price volatility than a continuous market, making it even more unattractive to firms.

 

The Upshot

 

Cantwell-Collins injects some great ideas into the climate policy debate that had not been prominently discussed before. If a policymaker wants to reduce the burden of increased energy costs on consumers, a direct rebate is an efficient and effective way to do it. The bill overall, however, is a somewhat naïve approach that does not fully appreciate the ability of markets to generate efficient emissions reductions and does not limit carbon emissions effectively. Its merits (simplified approach, upstream regulation, price collar) are outweighed by its limitations (extremely slow cap reduction, heavy reliance on CERT-funded reduction programs, draconian market restrictions). The CLEAR Act will continue to play a role in the climate debate of the Hill, but in its current form, it is unlikely to be the last bill standing.

 

In addition to his work at the Progressive Fix, Danny Morris is a Research Associate with Resources for the Future and a regular contributor to Common Tragedies

Published: Apr-01-10 | 4 Comments

Feb23

U.S. Climate Action Slogs Forward

Cap and Trade, Kerry-Boxer, Congress

 

A comprehensive climate and energy plan is “on a short track in terms of piecing together legislation” in the Senate, according Sen. John Kerry. The senior senator from Massachusetts said his work with Sens. Lindsey Graham and Joseph Lieberman on a bipartisan climate bill continues and, though he declined to give specifics, said Tuesday "it will be different than anything that has been put on the table in the House or Senate to date."

 

Kerry’s commitment to action was echoed by a series of key energy and environmental players gathered at the National Press Club to discuss the future of climate legislation. From Capitol Hill to K Street and the White House to Foggy Bottom, climate and energy legislation is still—slowly—moving forward. Indeed, the final—albeit massive—stumbling blocks appear to be determining if a carbon pricing mechanism of any form can garner 60 votes, and getting past health care to the Senate can take the measure up in earnest. And from the shape of the forum’s conversations it looks like emerging clean energy policies will be built around a few key notions:

 

A price on carbon: Clear price signals, like the kind that would be created once firms were charged for the rights to emit greenhouse gases, have the power to mobilize investment and innovation. If businesses don’t know how much climate regulation will cost them or when it may be set in motion, they can’t figure out to what extent technologies that emit less carbon will be worth investing in. Karen Harbert, president and CEO Institute for 21st Century Energy at the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, emphasized that regulatory uncertainty in health care, energy and other areas is one of the main barriers in the path of economic recovery (although she may well believe that this certainty can be created without putting a price on carbon). Sen. Kerry echoed Sen. Graham’s recent remarks that an “energy-only” bill or a bill without any carbon pricing mechanism does not have the teeth necessary to create strong incentives for business.

 

A preference for legislation over regulation: In accordance with a 2007 Supreme Court ruling, the Environmental Protection Agency is running a course parallel to Congress and designing agency plans to regulate the emission of greenhouse gases under the Clean Air Act. Nearly every participant in Tuesday’s forum expressed a clear preference in climate policy for the flexibility of legislation over EPA regulation. Legislation provides a clearer path for designing a program that is best suited for regulating greenhouse gases—whether through cost containment mechanisms or coverage tailoring—instead of the traditional air pollutants originally intended for regulation through the Clean Air Act.

 

Jobs, Jobs, Jobs (not in China, China, China): Since the economy and jobs are the top priorities of the American people, the administration and the Republican Party, the climate debate will continue to be dominated by arguments on both sides that their support or opposition for an energy and climate bill is better for the economy than the alternative. Sen. Kerry cited a variety of studies showing that hundreds of thousands to millions of jobs in clean energy industries will be created by cap-and-trade legislation. Multiple panelists pointed to China’s $400 billion in domestic clean energy financing as a critical reason for the United States to move rapidly and not risk falling behind in what many see as the greatest economic opportunity of the 21st century.

 

Andrew Stevenson is a research assistant at Resources for the Future and regular contributor to Common Tragedies.

Published: Feb-23-10 | 0 Comments

Oct29

Updated: Side-by-Side Comparison of Climate and Energy Legislation

Congress, Kerry-Boxer, Waxman-Markey

 

As more blanks in draft legislation are filled in, Daniel F. Morris has this updated comparison of House and Senate climate and energy bills from the 111th Congress:


Download Comparison (PDF)

 

And if tables aren’t your thing:

 

Targets

  • Waxman-Markey seeks a 17% reduction of 2005 covered emissions levels in 2020.
    Kerry-Boxer seeks a 20% reduction of 2005 covered emissions levels in 2020.

  •  

    Allowance allocations

  • Waxman-Markey distributes approximately 85% of allocations to public and private entities and makes 15% available for auction in 2012.
  • Kerry-Boxer establishes an initial reservation of allocations, including set asides for deficit reduction and the strategic reserve, as well as stipulates specific usage of auction revenue. Not including the initial reservation, 78% of allocations are distributed and 23% are auctioned.

  •  

    Reserve allowances

  • Waxman-Markey sets the reserve allowance price at $28 (2009 dollars) in 2012, which increases to 160% of 36-month rolling average daily reserve price after 2015.
  • Kerry-Boxer sets the reserve allowance price at $28 (2005 dollars) in 2012, which increases by 5% plus inflation until 2017, then by 7% plus inflation.

  •  

    Offset amounts

  • Waxman-Markey sets a ceiling of 2 billion credits, 1 billion domestic and 1 billion international, though international can substitute for domestic up to 1.5 total international credits.
  • Kerry-Boxer sets a ceiling of 2 billion credits, 1.5 billion domestic and .5 billion international, though international can substitute for domestic up to 1.25 total international credits.

  •  

    Carbon market regulation

  • Waxman-Markey delegates authority to the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission to regulate carbon-trading cash markets and to the Commodity Futures Trading Commission to regulate derivative markets.
  • Kerry-Boxer delegates all authority over carbon-trading markets (cash and derivatives) to the Commodity Futures Trading Commission.

  •  

    International competitiveness

  • Waxman Markey allocates 15% of allowances to trade-sensitive industries and may require, in the absence of an international agreement, an international reserve allowance program (border tariffs) starting in 2020.
  • Kerry-Boxer will allocate some amount of allowances to trade-sensitive industries and has placeholder language indicating the use of some kind of ‘border measure.’

  •  

    EPA authority

  • Waxman-Markey removes the authority of the EPA to further regulate large sources of greenhouse gases with the inception of the program.
  • Kerry-Boxer maintains the EPA’s authority to regulate large greenhouse gas sources in addition to the emissions reduction program.

  •  

    Renewable electricity standards

  • Waxman-Markey establishes a 15% renewable energy standard with a 5% improved energy efficiency standards for a combined total of 20% by 2020.
  • Kerry-Boxer does not include any language establishing renewable energy standards.
  •  

    Leave your questions and comments below or contact Daniel, morris@rff.org, or RFF’s Climate Policy Program Director Ray Kopp, kopp@rff.org.

    Published: Oct-29-09 | 0 Comments

    Oct28

    The Implications of Allocation Language in Kerry-Boxer

    Allocations, Kerry-Boxer, Waxman-Markey

     

    At first blush, the allocation language in S. 1733 is very similar to the language in H.R. 2454. In 2016, the first year all covered sources are part of the program, local distribution companies (LDCs) receive 30% of allocations, merchant coal and long-term contract generators receive 5%, natural gas LDCs receive 9%, and trade-vulnerable industries receive about 14.4%. These allocations are either exactly the same as they were in H.R. 2454 or are very similar.

     

    There are, however, some notable differences that have implications for distribution. First, S. 1733 specifically identifies percentages to be auctioned for the benefit of certain constituencies. For example, S. 1733 stipulates that 15% of allocations be auctioned and the revenues be used as consumer rebates for low and medium-income households. The result is that in 2016, 77.78% of allocations are given away and 23.15% are auctioned. Comparatively, H.R. 2454 gives away 84% of allocations and auctions 16% in 2016.

     

    Second, and perhaps more important, is that S. 1733 establishes an ‘initial reservation’ of allowances. Sec. 771(d)(1) states:

     

    In general.–Before allocating emission allowances under subsections (a) through (c) for each calendar year, the Administrator shall reserve from the total quantity of emission allowances established for the calendar year under section 721(a) the percentages for allowances specified in paragraphs (2) through (9), for use for the purposes described in those paragraphs.

     

    Sections (a) through (c) include the language “Subject to subsection (d), of the total quantity of emission allowances established for each vintage year under section 721(a), the Administrator shall allocate…” The corresponding effect on allocations could be one of two things, depending on your interpretation of Sec. 771(d)(1) and the qualifying language in subsections (a) through (c):

     

    1. The initial reservation is simply allocated first, then the other allocations are distributed or auctioned according to the designated percentage for that vintage year. If this is the case, then in 2016, 15.75% of allocations are initially reserved, 77.78% of allocations are given away, and 23.15% of allocations are auctioned. Allocations, according to this interpretation, are 116.68% of the 2016 emissions caps.

     

    2. The initial reservation is taken from the total pool of allocations, then the corresponding percentages are taken from the remaining allocation total. Since the initial reservation is 15.75% of allocations, then 84.25% are still left over. This means in 2016, 65.53% of allocations (77.78% of 84.25) would be given away and 19.50% would be auctioned. The total for allocations in 2016 under this interpretation is 100.78% of the 2016 cap.

     

    The second interpretation could have significant ramifications for entities that are given free allocations. For the constituents listed in the first paragraph, their allocations from the total cap in 2016 would be altered thusly: LDCs would receive 25.28%, merchant coal and long-term contract generators would receive 4.21%, natural gas LDCs would receive 7.58%, and trade-vulnerable industries would receive 12.13%. For comparison, H.R. 2454 gives 30% of allocations to LDCs, 5% to merchant coal and long-term contract generators, 9% to natural gas LDCs, and 14% to trade-vulnerable industries in 2016. It is important to note that these changes may represent the writers of the legislation’s intent to provide more direct transfer of the value of allocations to taxpayers. Put simply, rather than shrinking the whole pie for firms and consumers, these changes give another piece to taxpayers.

     

    Daniel F. Morris is a research assistant at Resources for the Future and regular contributor to Common Tragedies.

    Published: Oct-28-09 | 0 Comments

    Oct27

    Would Weaker Targets Reduce Allowance Prices?

    Kerry-Boxer, Congress, Allocations

     

    Smokestack image courtesy LibraryofCongress via Flickr The recent spate of hearings in the Energy and Natural Resources Committee and those planned this week for Environment and Public Works Committee signal the Senate’s re-engagement on comprehensive climate legislation. Surely, one of the front-and-center issues will be the higher energy prices resulting from a cap-and-trade program for greenhouse gases (GHGs). The magnitude of the energy price increase is directly linked to the price of GHG allowances—the permits firms must have to emit GHGs—, which in turn depends on the severity of the cap. Generally, the more strict the cap, the greater the allowance price and therefore the greater the energy price increase.

     

    Clearly, higher energy prices are politically undesirable and therefore some legislators are likely to argue for weaker early-year emission caps than those in the Senate’s Kerry-Boxer bill. But would weaker caps in, for example, the first decade of a program actually lower allowance prices?

     

    Like far too many questions in economics, the answer is maybe. The logic behind the answer has to do with banking of allowances and expectations of future allowance prices.

     

    Kerry-Boxer grants emitters the right to bank allowances. An emitter of can buy allowances when the program begins, hold on to them indefinitely, and use them for compliance purposes at any point in the future.

     

    Why would an emitter do this? The emitter may expect the cost of reducing future emissions (reflected in allowance price) to be very high due to tight future caps. If the emitter expects the allowances price to rise faster than the rate of return the emitter can earn on its capital, the emitter will save a portion of the allowances it purchases or is given today, and use them in the future, thereby profiting on the rise in the allowance price.

     

    This savings is precisely the behavior one sees in analyses of the House’s Waxman-Markey (America’s Clean Energy and Security Act) by both The Environmental Protection Agency and Energy Information Administration where emitters build up a very large bank of allowances. Since they are not using the allowances for compliance, they actually reduce their emissions by an amount greater than that called for by the cap—termed over compliance. This over compliance results in allowance prices greater than they would be if emitters simply complied with the year-by-year caps.

     

    If all emitters have the same and accurate expectations about future compliance costs, the price of allowances will rise at the rate of interest. Again, this is exactly what you see in the EPA and EIA analyses.

     

    Now suppose you weaken the early-year emissions caps, but future caps remain unchanged. If expectations of future compliance cost are unchanged, the weaker caps simply lead to an even larger bank and greater over compliance, and allowance prices generally will not decline. Thus, weakening the early period caps seemingly does not make allowances cheaper and therefore will not dampen the resulting energy price increases.

     

    Why, then, did I say the answer is maybe when I just argued above that the answer is no? Because we are not sure that real emitters act as the models assume. Emitters in the models, 1) have perfect foresight, i.e., they know what the future holds with respect to the cost reducing emissions, 2) are long-run maximizers, i.e., will sacrifice short-term gains in favor of larger long-term gains, and 3) all share the same rate of return on capital that is equal to the rate of interest in the model.

     

    Obviously, in the real world the future is not known and everyone must guess. Those guessing that future compliance costs will be high will be savers, those expecting technology breakthroughs to lower cost will use their allowances now. As the recent recession has demonstrated, not all (perhaps none) of the emitters may be long-run maximizers, choosing instead to focus on near term gains, in which case they will be less likely to bank allowances for use in the future. Finally, emitters may have investment hurdle rates (the rate of return they require on capital) that differ from emitter to emitter. Those with lower hurdle rates will bank; those with higher rates may not.

     

    So, if you believe in the assumptions of the models, weakening near term caps is unlikely to lower the near term price increase in energy. However, if you reject those assumptions, one can argue that weakened near term targets will dampen energy price increases.

     

    Of course, none of this touches on the important issue of short-run price volatility in the allowance market which can lead to short run spikes in energy prices. This too is liable to be of considerable concern to senators as they consider climate and energy legislation.

     

    Raymond J. Kopp is a senior fellow and director of Resources for the Future’s Climate Policy Program.

    Published: Oct-27-09 | 0 Comments

    Oct15

    The Role Regional Differences Play in U.S. Climate Policy

    United States, Testimony, Waxman-Markey, Kerry-Boxer

     

    The careful design of a policy to cap greenhouse gases will be key to ensuring any resulting economic burden is shared equally across industries and regions, according to Congressional Budget Office Director Doug Elmendorf who testified before the Senate Energy and Natural Resources Committee Wednesday.

     

    Transitioning to a low-carbon economy— the essential goal of a carbon dioxide cap-and-trade program —would probably mean some growing pains in the form of job losses in fossil-fuel intensive industries, according to Elmendorf.

     

    "The fact that (renewable energy) jobs turn up somewhere else for some people does not mean that there aren't substantial costs borne by people, communities, firms in affected industries in affected areas," he said.

     

    A nationwide climate and energy policy means different things to different regions both in terms of industry and consumers. The U.S. covers a vast expanse of land and industries are built around a variety of resources— with a variety of CO2 emission outputs. Moreover, energy consumption in homes and businesses varies across the country depending upon climate and available energy sources. (Check out a great interactive map that illustrates the differences from NPR.)

     

    Such regional discrepancies have been the focus of research here at RFF, including this 2008 discussion paper from researchers Dallas Burtraw, Margaret Walls and Richard Sweeney, and a recently-published study in the journal Climatic Change.

    In “Regional Patterns of U.S. Household Carbon Emissions,” RFF Nonresident Fellow James Sanchirico and coauthors Billy Pizer and Michael Batz use consumer expenditure data covering 1984–2000 to estimate the short-run geographical impacts of a hypothetical $10 per-ton tax on CO2 at a county level.

     

    According to the authors, U.S. households, on average, spent almost $4,000 per household on electricity, fuel oil, natural gas, and gasoline in 2005, with expenditures varying considerably across regions and subpopulations. Substantial differences across regions lead to the direct impacts of the tax ranging from $97 dollars per year per household in Manhattan to $235 per year per household in Tensas Parish, Louisiana.

     

    Read more about Regional Patterns of U.S. Household Carbon Emissions here.

     

    Tiffany Clements is managing editor of Weathervane.

    Published: Oct-15-09 | 0 Comments

    Oct07

    Senator Warns of Energy Sprawl, Calls for Nuclear Power Expansion

    Renewables, Kerry-Boxer, Congress, Waxman-Markey, Nuclear

     

    Image courtesy Ellen DaveySen. Lamar Alexander is calling on Congress to include nuclear power in its energy portfolio, touting it as a reliable source of low-carbon energy that consumes a small fraction of the land used by other energy sources like wind, solar, and biomass.

     

    Speaking at an RFF Policy Leadership Forum Monday, the Tennessee Republican said building 100 new nuclear plants in the next 20 years, electrifying half the U.S. vehicle fleet, and the addition of solar panels to roofs of existing structures is “the best way to reach the necessary carbon goals for climate change with the least damage to our environment and to our economy.”

     

    Alexander’s remarks drew heavily from a recent Nature Conservancy report. The research offered some interesting insight, which should be taken with a caveat, into the variation in land use for different energy sources. It’s a concept the paper’s authors dub “energy sprawl.”

     

    (Chart Source)

    Sen. Alexander asked event attendees “to do something that gives many conservationists a stomach ache whenever it is mentioned--and that is to rethink nuclear power, because as the Nature Conservancy’s paper details, nuclear power in several ways produces the largest amounts of carbon-free electricity with the least impact.”

    But despite the senator’s strong support—and the support of numerous prominent Republicans—nuclear’s place in any domestic legislation is largely uncertain.

     

    Draft climate legislation in the Senate seems to have given nuclear a greater push than the House’s bill, including provisions that offer funding for research and development and remove barriers to deployment. Green Grok Dr. Bill Chameides says if history is any indicator, nuclear proponents shouldn’t count their reactors before they’ve hatched:

     

    Nuclear energy is one of those hot-button issues. For some Senate fence-sitters support for nuclear energy is critical and thus fleshing out these provisions may help to bring such folks into the fold. But for many environmentalists, support of nuclear power is a deal-killer. At least that was the case in 2005 when subsidies for nuclear were added to the McCain-Lieberman climate bill. The addition brought minimal support from the right, while losing the support of key Democratic senators (including Barbara Boxer). In the end the bill went down to a resounding defeat.

     

    Visit RFF’s event page to watch Sen. Alexander’s address or find a link to a transcript of his remarks.

     

    Tiffany Clements is managing editor of Weathervane.

    Published: Oct-07-09 | 0 Comments

    Oct05

    A Side-by-Side Look at House and Senate Climate Bills

    Waxman-Markey, United States, Congress, Kerry-Boxer

     

    RFF’s Daniel Morris has pulled together the following side-by-side chart of how key economic elements in House and Senate climate and energy legislation from the 111th Congress compare.

     

    Download Comparison (PDF)

     

    He also took a broader look at the major components of each piece of legislation as of October 2, 2009. Here are the highlights from his analysis:

     

    Targets


  • Waxman-Markey seeks a 17% reduction of 2005 covered emissions levels in 2020.
  • Kerry-Boxer seeks a 20% reduction of 2005 covered emissions levels in 2020.

     

    Allowance allocations


  • Waxman-Markey distributes approximately 85% of allocations to public and private entities and makes 15% available for auction.
  • Kerry-Boxer has not yet determined full allocations, though it stipulates that 25% of allocations be auctioned to reduce the federal deficit.

     

    Reserve allowances


  • Waxman-Markey sets the reserve allowance price at $28 (2009 dollars) in 2012, which increases to 160% of 36-month rolling average daily reserve price after 2015.
  • Kerry-Boxer sets the reserve allowance price at $28 (2005 dollars) in 2012, which increases by 5% plus inflation until 2017, then by 7% plus inflation.

     

    Offset amounts


  • Waxman-Markey sets a ceiling of 2 billion credits, 1 billion domestic and 1 billion international, though international can substitute for domestic up to 1.5 total international credits.
  • Kerry-Boxer sets a ceiling of 2 billion credits, 1.5 billion domestic and .5 billion international, though international can substitute for domestic up to 1.25 total international credits.

     

    Carbon market regulation


  • Waxman-Markey delegates authority to the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission to regulate carbon-trading cash markets and to the Commodity Futures Trading Commission to regulate derivative markets.
  • Kerry-Boxer delegates all authority over carbon-trading markets (cash and derivatives) to the Commodity Futures Trading Commission.

     

    International competitiveness


  • Waxman Markey allocates 15% of allowances to trade-sensitive industries and may require, in the absence of an international agreement, a international reserve allowance program (border tariffs) starting in 2020.
  • Kerry-Boxer will allocate some amount of allowances to trade-sensitive industries and has placeholder language indicating the use of some kind of ‘border measure.’

     

    EPA authority


  • Waxman-Markey removes the authority of the EPA to further regulate large sources of greenhouse gases with the inception of the program.
  • Kerry-Boxer maintains the EPA’s authority to regulate large greenhouse gas sources in addition to the emissions reduction program.

     

    Renewable electricity standards


  • Waxman-Markey establishes a 15% renewable energy standard with a 5% improved energy efficiency standards for a combined total of 20% by 2020.
  • Kerry-Boxer does not include any language establishing renewable energy standards.

       

  • Leave your questions and comments below or contact Daniel, morris@rff.org, or RFF’s Climate Policy Program Director Ray Kopp, kopp@rff.org.

    Published: Oct-05-09 | 0 Comments


    2010 Oil Spill Adaptation Atlas