Sep11

What Can We Learn from RGGI Auction Prices?

RGGI, Safety Valve, Price Collar, Waxman-Markey

 

Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative auction prices hit their lowest mark since the program began selling polluting rights last year.

 

The auction to disperse CO2 emissions permits in ten northeastern states sold allowances for the 2009 vintage at a price of $2.19/each—down 32 percent from June—and allowances for the 2012 vintage at a price of $1.87/each—down 9 percent from June.

  

As Keith Johnson pointed over at Environmental Capital earlier this week, three things likely sent prices plunging:

 

First, state authorities appear to have made a similar mistake as European authorities did when they started their own cap-and-trade program. That is, they over-estimated the amount of permits that power companies would need to cover their emissions requirements. The result is a surplus of pollution permits, which pushes their price down.

 

Second, the recession whacked demand for electricity, which means that power plants emitted even less than they thought they would.

 

Third, cheap natural gas over the last year has made it easier for power companies to switch to the cleaner-burning fuel, which again means fewer emissions of greenhouse-gases.

 

Lawmakers plodding through a discussion of a national plan to cap CO2 emissions would be wise to learn a thing or two from RGGI. Namely, finding the right balance of permits and pricing is crucial to realizing environmental benefits with the least amount of economic woe. A “price collar,” like the one included in the bill passed by the House in June, may be one way to strike that right balance, as Ray Kopp points out in this post:

 

Short-run demand and supply conditions can lead to significant allowance price volatility, as we have seen in the European Union’s carbon market. Very low allowance prices may not provide the needed incentives for conservation, and the development and deployment of new technology. H.R. 2454 adopts and minimum price auction ($10 reserve price in 2012) to set an allowance price floor.  To the extent the Strategic Reserve Auction can act as a credible price ceiling, the bill now contains a price “collar,” the combination of a floor and ceiling designed to minimize allowance price volatility. 

 

Tiffany Clements is managing editor of Weathervane. Contact her at clements@rff.org.

Published: Sep-11-09 | 1 Comment

Sep10

Thursday's Reads

International, Waxman-Markey, Carbon Market, RGGI, Morning Reads

 

WSJ: The Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative, RGGI, held its fifth permit auction Wednesday. An excess of permits and low electricity demand are expected to keep permit auction prices extremely low.

 

Reuters: Senate rumblings suggest climate may not make it through this session.

 

WSJ: The CTFC wants to be the agency in charge of regulating greenhouse gas credit markets. Meanwhile the EIA says it will expand its data collecting and analysis of energy and financial markets to aid Congress and the White House in meeting their goal of greater transparency.

 

Reuters: President Nicolas Sarkozy announced his plans to implement a carbon tax in France.

 

Reuters: The EU pledges more than $15 billion a year by 2020 to help developing nations combat climate change.

 

And what the Senate should consider as the top six priorities in the Waxman-Markey energy bill.

 

Did we miss something today? Let us know, leave a comment or email clements@rff.org.

Published: Sep-10-09 | 0 Comments

May19

Waxman-Markey Auction Plan Draws Heavily from RGGI

Cap and Trade, Carbon Market, Congress, RGGI, Waxman-Markey
 
There are undeniable similarities between the proposed emissions auctioning scheme in the newly-released draft of the Waxman-Markey energy bill (H.R. 2454) and the approach adopted for allowance auctions in the ten-state cooperative arrangement in the Northeast, the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative (RGGI).
 
With little precedent to look to, it appears the framers of H.R. 2454 have taken a few pages from the recommendations of the RGGI auction design study, the basis for RGGI’s auction scheme.  This plan was designed by RFF researchers Dallas Burtraw and Karen Palmer, with Charles Holt and William Shobe of the University of Virginia, and Jacob Goeree of the California Institute of Technology.
 
The proposed plan incorporates a number of elements included in RGGI’s auction framework like adopting a single round, sealed bid, uniform price auction format that incorporates both current and future “allowance vintages,” giving purchasers the opportunity to plan for future allowance needs. Waxman-Markey also establishes a similar quarterly timeframe for holding auctions, limits on the percentage of allowances any one entity may purchase, and calls for a minimum reserve price for allowances sold in the auction (as Ray Kopp discussed in this post).

 

Tiffany Clements is managing editor of Weathervane.

Published: May-19-09 | 1 Comment


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