What’s Next for U.S. and International Climate Policy
The nations of the world came together in Copenhagen this past December to continue a process begun in 1992 at the Rio Summit to address the causes and consequences of climate change. The ultimate goal of that process is to reach an international agreement that will limit global greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions to “safe” levels while at the same time ensuring the nations most vulnerable to the impacts of climate change are provided the financial and technical means to adapt to a changed climate.
As I mentioned in my previous posts (here, here and here), this series will provide a view of Copenhagen from a distinctly American perspective, blending global economics with domestic U.S. politics. The outcome of Copenhagen and the international process that now follows is shaped largely by the domestic politics of all the major emitting countries with U.S. domestic politics playing a particularly large role.
In this post, I’ll take a look at where international negotiations are likely to go after Copenhagen and what role the U.S. will play on the international stage going forward.
International Negotiations Post Copenhagen
One can argue that Copenhagen marked a substantial shift in the dynamics of global climate policy development. A good deal of that shift is due to the renewed presence of the U.S. in international negotiations. Copenhagen moved the development of global policy further away from a Kyoto-like agreement, not closer. And, Copenhagen perhaps signaled a move further from the UN 190+ nation process and closer to a process taking place at venues like the Major Economies Forum (MEF). Certainly, this is the desire of the U.S.; however, it remains to be seen whether the BASIC countries (Brazil, South Africa, India and China) will agree to this radical shift in negotiating venue. Regardless, it seems almost certain issues like the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM), sectoral offsets, Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Degradation (REDD), adaptation, and finance will likely remain within the UNFCCC negotiating structure.
Copenhagen made clear the goal of a comprehensive, legally binding agreement setting emission reduction targets for developed countries while requiring no action on the part of major developing economies ala the Kyoto Protocol, is not achievable. What is achievable is a process of bottom-up pledge and review where the major developed and developing countries agree to take domestic actions to limit their emissions, agree to some form of monitoring, reporting and verification (MRV), review these actions after a suitable period of time to see if everyone is abiding by their pledges, then pledge again. Pledge and review is not as elegant as Kyoto, but is a whole lot more practical.
While the Copenhagen Accord does include language setting an aspirational goal limiting emissions to 2 degrees C, one doubts whether anyone with a sense of politics finds that fact comforting. The GHG concentration at which we will eventually stabilize—and therefore the temperature rise that will be achieved—will not be predetermined neatly by science, but rather, by the messy business of politics and the reality of economics.
Adapting to New Negotiating Framework
As the major economies take the lead in forging agreements, and to the extent the venue for those negotiations moves beyond the UNFCCC to other processes, the interests of poor nations in issues of adaptation can become overlooked. The primary concern of the major economies in international negotiations is their emissions, not adaptation. Interest in adaptation and other issues particularly salient to developing countries are secondary concerns, largely due to the fact that most of the major economies (emitters) are reasonably developed (or well on their way) and will be able to adapt. Once the major economies take their mitigation negotiations out of the UNFCCC, the poor countries who will suffer climate impacts might end up talking to themselves about adaptation.
If the U.S. does not pass comprehensive legislation establishing a domestic cap-and-trade program that admits international offsets, a broad and deep global carbon market may fail to materialize. Absent such a market, the amount of wealth that will be transferred from the north to the south will be small and will get smaller over time. Without private sector money flowing to developing countries to purchase offsets the transfer of wealth will have to come from government tax revenues. In the U.S., and I expect elsewhere, it will be a very difficult political challenge to get these flows up to the levels needed and even more difficult to maintain those flows over time.
Long-term funding for adaptation will be particularly difficult to amass. While mitigation lends itself to a carbon market, there is not a private market analog for adaptation. Many adaptation projects look to the financier as straightforward economic development projects, where the risk tends to be high and rate of return low. Without private capital interest in these projects poor countries are left relying on highly uncertain developed country government funds.
U.S. Negotiating Position Post Copenhagen
If, as I believe, Copenhagen signals a very different process for reaching global climate agreements, the roles of the major economies will grow and the U.S. will have more opportunity to exercise leadership. Understanding the U.S. negotiating position going forward is aided by the simple fact that domestic climate policy and politics will form the proper foundation for foreign policy with respect to climate change. The Clinton administration let the formulation of climate foreign policy precede the development of domestic climate policy. Those actions angered the U.S. Senate and doomed the Kyoto Protocol in the U.S. The Obama administration will not make that mistake.
The U.S. negotiating stance going forward can be summed up with a few short sentences. The U.S. will attempt to establish the MEF as the venue for future mitigation agreement negotiations. The general form of the agreement sought will be pledge and review of Nationally Appropriate Mitigation Actions (NAMAs) by all MEF members with suitably strong MRV requirements. The Kyoto track within the UNFCCC will not be supported. Mitigation NAMAs for the U.S. will be identical to those passed by the U.S. Congress (whatever those actions might be). Since the U.S. NAMAs will be written into domestic law, the U.S. will hold these are legally binding on their own and therefore do not need to be included in a treaty; however, the U.S. would not block such a treaty should one be developed. If the U.S. Congress passes cap-and-trade legislation with international offsets, the U.S. will be able to deliver funds to developing countries for mitigation. REDD+ and sectoral offsets will be supported by the U.S. If domestic cap-and-trade legislation with international offsets is passed, REDD+ will be high on the negotiating priority list.
Raymond J. Kopp is a senior fellow and director of Resources for the Future’s Center for Climate and Electricity Policy.