How the U.S. Approached Copenhagen and What Came of it

The nations of the world came together in Copenhagen this past December to continue a process begun in 1992 at the Rio Summit to address the causes and consequences of climate change. The ultimate goal of that process is to reach an international agreement that will limit global greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions to “safe” levels while at the same time ensuring the nations most vulnerable to the impacts of climate change are provided the financial and technical means to adapt to a changed climate.

As I mentioned in my previous posts (here and here), this series will provide a view of Copenhagen from a distinctly American perspective, blending global economics with domestic U.S. politics. The outcome of Copenhagen and the international process that now follows is shaped largely by the domestic politics of all the major emitting countries with U.S. domestic politics playing a particularly large role.

In this post, I’ll take a closer look at where the U.S. stood in the run up to Copenhagen and how that led to some positive and negative outcomes from the conference.

Copenhagen Accord: The U.S Position going into Copenhagen

The U.S. negotiating position at Copenhagen reflected domestic political concerns. The foundation for the position was the constraint imposed by the White House that under no circumstances could the negotiating team appear to be pre-empting the U.S. Congress in setting emission reduction goals. The negotiators were free to utilize the reduction goals in Waxman-Markey (17 percent below 2005 levels in 2020, and 83 percent below 2005 levels in 2050), but they could not enter into negotiations over more stringent the goals. Thus, the U.S. team did not go to Copenhagen prepared to negotiate targets nor was it authorized to do so.

If the U.S. is to be a signatory to a new treaty serving as the successor to the Kyoto Protocol the new treaty would have to be ratified by the U.S. Senate. Ratification of international treaties requires 67 senators to vote in favor. As I said in my previous post, it is politically challenging to amass 60 votes to pass domestic climate legislation; clearly, it’s more difficult to amass 67 votes. Therefore, the negotiating team was prepared to make it clear that U.S. ratification of a Kyoto successor was highly unlikely. The U.S. negotiating position, developed over the past several years, sought the abandonment of the Berlin Mandate (the Mandate serves to exempt non-Annex 1 countries from any responsibility to reduce GHG emissions) and an agreement requiring all countries, and particularly countries participating in the Major Economies Forum (MEF), to agree to undertake a series of domestic mitigation actions and bind themselves legally to execute those actions. These actions, termed “Nationally Appropriate Mitigation Actions” (NAMAs) are of the countries’ own choosing. The binding international commitment would be reflected in the domestic enforcement of these actions under a country’s own laws. In addition, some sort of agreed to monitoring, reporting and verification (MRV) of the NAMAs would be required as part of the agreement.

Given the U.S. interest and focus on an agreement built around NAMAs, combined with the fact the U.S. is not a party to the Kyoto Protocol, progress along the Kyoto track (Ad Hoc Working Group on Further Commitments for Annex I Parties under the Kyoto Protocol (AWG-KP)) was not a part of the U.S. negotiating objectives. The U.S. was and is placing all its effort on the Ad Hoc Working Group on Long-Term Cooperative Action (AWG-LCA).

Since a handful of nations can block a UNFCCC agreement—as we saw at the end of COP-15 negotiations—the U.S. sees the process as severely dysfunctional with respect to global agreements to limit GHG emissions. The U.S. much prefers the MEF as the venue for collaboration and cooperation on international climate policy. Indeed, a “MEF Plus” that includes an additional half dozen or so representative developing countries giving the MEF a bit more international credibility would likely be welcomed by the U.S.

U.S. negotiators were supportive of policies to incentivize the conservation of forests to reduce emissions, known as REDD+, the establishment of a credible and efficient sectoral offset policy to accompany the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM), funds for developing countries to finance GHG mitigation and adaptation, and a robust global carbon market. Indeed, the carbon market is the primary mechanism by which U.S. funds (private sector dollars) would flow to developing countries for mitigation efforts. The U.S. was also supportive of the flow of government funds to aid mitigation and adaptation efforts; however, it is unlikely the U.S. would agree to the distribution of these funds via a process solely administered by the UN.

The Copenhagen Accord: What Went Well

From the U.S. perspective the Copenhagen Accord produced many good results. Perhaps the most important outcome was the agreement hammered out by the U.S. and the BASIC countries (Brazil, South Africa, India and China) to put forward NAMAs, enter those into an agreed upon registry, and the inclusion of some MRV language in the final agreement. While the actions contained in the registry at the current time are not enough to solve the climate problem, they are a step forward.

A 2 degree C maximum mean global temperature increase goal was agreed upon, providing an important long-term objective. Importantly, significant pledges of near and longer-term finance for mitigation and adaptation were made, even approaching the lower end of what is generally believed to be necessary. Pledged near-term finance (2010-2012) amounted to $30 billion while longer term pledges (2012-2020) were $100 billion.

What Went Poorly

On the negative side of the ledger six countries (out of the 190+ participating in the negotiations)—Sudan, Venezuela, Bolivia, Nicaragua, Cuba and Tuvalu—rejected the Accord and prevented it from being adopted as an official decision of the Conference of the Parties (COP). Parties agreeing to the Accord could only officially “take note.” This leaves a great deal of ambiguity with respect to the manner in which progress toward further development of the Accord can take place with the context of the UNFCCC.

Perhaps more worrisome, the negotiations almost certainly would have failed without direct intervention from heads of state. The severe dysfunctionality of the UNFCCC/COP process was clear, as ministers and countries’ representatives failed to make any progress in advance of the COP and the arrival of heads of state.

From a U.S. perspective key elements were missing from the text, specifically, 80 percent reduction target by developed countries by 2050, 50 percent global reduction by 2050, due primarily to developing country resistance, specifically China. Moreover, developing countries were unwilling to make the outcomes (NAMAs) legally binding and it is unclear whether they would ever do so.

Lots of discussions moved forward without having text adopted, including forestry, technology, adaptation and finance. These tracts needed more time and high-level engagement to be completed. Forestry seemed to move the furthest along; technology and intellectual property issues still need more development and thought, and the Copenhagen Green Climate Fund needs a good deal more elaboration prior to COP-16 in Mexico.

Raymond J. Kopp is a senior fellow and director of Resources for the Future’s Center for Climate and Electricity Policy.