Joshua Blonz’s research focuses on environmental economics and policy. He uses empirical techniques to examine policy-relevant questions informed by theoretical models of environmental policy and energy markets. He is particularly interested in the role of policy design and implementation in program outcomes. Blonz’s current work focuses on electricity pricing policy, the costs of environmental regulation in the coal sector, and the role of the principal-agent problem in policy implementation.
The Welfare Costs of Misaligned Incentives: Energy Inefficiency and the Principal-Agent Problem
I measure the welfare costs of the principal-agent problem in the context of an energy efficiency appliance upgrade program. I find that the principal-agent problem turns an otherwise welfare-increasing program into a welfare-reducing program.
Testimony and Public Comments
Comments on the US Department of Energy’s Office of Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy’s Request for Information on Energy Conservation Standards Program Design
Bringing CAFE style flexibility to appliance standards can improve program efficiency if implemented carefully. A pilot program with limited trading scope can provide insights for future implementation.